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INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 2009, the United States Department of
Commerce ("DOC") and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN") signed an "Affirmation of Commitments"'
("Affirmation") that purports to recast the public-private relationship at
the heart of the management of the domain name system ("DNS").
ICANN trumpeted this document as a culmination of the move from
public to private control of the DNS, one that ICANN said "completes a
transition that started 11 years ago" and "places beyond doubt that the
ICANN model is best equipped to coordinate" the DNS. 2 ICANN's
CEO Rod Beckstrom summarized ICANN's commitments in the
Affirmation as follows: "It commits ICANN to remaining a private not
for profit organization. It declares ICANN is independent and is not
controlled by any one entity. It commits ICANN to reviews performed
BY THE COMMUNITY-a
further recognition that the
multi-stakeholder model is robust enough to review itself."3
This article examines the legal and political effects of the
Affirmation. It begins by asking what the Affirmation actually changes
in light of the pre-existing ICANN-DOC relationship. It then asks
what these changes tell us about ICANN's current legal status and about
its future. It concludes that even though the Affirmation has been overhyped, the agreement is nonetheless a significant milestone in the
evolution of the management of the DNS-but more for its political
than its legal import. As a legal matter, the DOC allowed one of its main
agreements with ICANN to lapse, thus surrendering the most formal
and visible legal control the DOC had over ICANN. In so doing, the
DOC gave up its reversionary interests in contracts ICANN had with
third parties-the DOC's right to require ICANN to assign those
1. See ICANN, AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES AND NUMBERS (2009) [hereinafter AFFIRMATION] (reprinted in Appendix). It is
almost required in a paper of this nature to quote Jeremy Rabkin's quip that an "Affirmation of
Commitment ... sounds a lot like marriage vows exchanged by same-sexers in a state where
gay marriage is not yet legal." Milton Mueller, Ask Us About ICANNs, Um, "Affirmation,"
INTERNET GOVERNANCE
PROJECT BLOG
(Sept. 29,
2009,
03:02 PM),
http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blogLarchives/2009/9/29/4336686.html (quoting Jeremy
Rabkin). In other words, the Affirmation reflects an attempt between a government and an
NGO to make a public commitment while also making a private agreement that the law does
not necessarily welcome into traditional legal categories-here contract and administrative
law-as warmly as the parties might wish.
2. The Affirmation of Commitments - What it Means, ICANN (Sept. 30, 2009),
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-30sepO9-en.htm.
3. Id. (capitalization in original).
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contracts to someone else were the DOC ever to lose faith in ICANN.
In exchange, ICANN promised to remain located in the U.S., thus
remaining subject to U.S. jurisdiction. ICANN also committed itself to a
lengthy round of accountability exercises, although whether these will
amount to anything substantive is not obvious. Furthermore, ICANN
again expanded the role of its Government Advisory Committee
("GAC"), a committee of government representatives open to every
nation, which has a direct channel to the ICANN Board as well some
agenda-setting powers.
If these changes are less legally earthshaking than the parties might
have sought to make them seem, their political import is nonetheless
real. By allowing its most visible agreement with ICANN to expire, the
DOC made a tangible-if still incomplete-response to growing
international pressure for the U.S. to abandon the control over ICANN
that other nations feared gave the U.S. a dominant role over the DNS.
ICANN enjoys significantly more independence after the Affirmation
than it had before. And the GAC, the only direct means by which nonU.S. governments can influence ICANN, emerges from the Affirmation
stronger as well.
The article then revisits two underlying issues that the Affirmation
papers over: what standby or fail-safe control the United States retains
over the DNS, and to what extent that (or any) control over the DNS
matters. Here the picture is less clear, but some of the answers are
surprising: the U.S. retains a lessened, but still real, degree of control
over the DNS-but it may not matter as much as many of us think. The
possible risks of having a body-be it public or private-in charge of the
DNS can be grouped into four categories: (1) primarily economic issues
involving market power over DNS service providers (registrars and
registries), (2) economic power exercised over registrants and other third
parties, (3) more general political power over speech or other uses of the
Internet, and (4) geo-strategic. Some of these, notably the economic
risks, the article argues, are much more real dangers than others. In
particular, the article asserts, the geo-strategic risk has been greatly
exaggerated.
Readers are assumed to understand the technical basis of the DNS. 4

4. Readers seeking an introduction to the DNS will find one, among other places, in
Part I of A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the
APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 37-50 (2000).
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THE AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS IN CONTEXT
A.

A Short History ofthe ICANN-DOC Relationship

More by accident than design, in the late 20th century the United
States Government found itself with de facto and also probably legal
control of the DNS. Oddly, at the time, this did not feel like an
unmitigated blessing as it thrust the U.S. Government into controversies
that seemed to have no politically palatable solutions.
In the 1980s and earlier, control of a small network used primarily
by academicss was of little interest to most people. But as the Internet
began to be commercialized in the late '80s and early '90s, and as its
growth accelerated, DNS issues became more contentious and began to
concern even the White House.' Proposals to create new top-leveldomains ("TLDs") ran into opposition from organized trademarkholders who already were concluding that the existing DNS was an
obstacle to their legal rights and brand-management objectives. Creating
new TLDs threatened more cybersquatting and more trademark
disputes, and they wanted none of it. On the other side, would-be
registries (the people with the authoritative database of domain names in
each TLD) and registrars (the people who sell' domain names to endusers) wishing to enter the domain-name-selling market sought more
names to sell, while firms who found themselves a little late to the
Internet party wanted short memorable names. Both sides looked
increasingly to the White House to solve their problems, and the White
House, in the person of Ira Magaziner, wanted to get rid of the (to this
day unsolved) problem as fast as possible.'
On June 5, 1998, the National Telecommunications and

5. On the early history of the Internet, see KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON,
WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1998).
6. See id. at 24.
7. Or lease, but let's not get into that debate. Readers wishing to know more may
consult Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 776-781 (2003)
("Understanding domain names as property accords with how they are treated in practice.");
Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Dofor Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159,
179 (2010) (discussing the Virginia Supreme Court's conclusion in Network Solutions, Inc. v.
Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000) that a domain name represents a service
contract, not property subject to garnishment); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Commercial Law
Collides with Cyberspace: The Trouble with Pesfection - Insecurity Interests in the New Corporate
Asset, 59 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 37, 65 (2002) ("The classification of domain names as either
property or contracts is an issue of first impression with which courts have struggled."); XuanThao N. Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance. The Trouble with Domain Name
Classification, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 186 (2001) (recognizing domain names as
intangible property).
8. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 24 (describing creation of inter-agency task force
headed by Magaziner).
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Information Administration ("NTIA") of the DOC issued a policy
statement, the "'White Paper," calling on private sector Internet
stakeholders to form a not-for-profit corporation to take over the
administration of the DNS and the Internet numbering system.9 On
October 26, 1998, ICANN was incorporated as a California not-forprofit corporation, and it then asked the DOC to choose it as the DOC's
private partner.'o After a number of complexities that need not detain us
now," on November 25, 1998, the DOC chose a somewhat modified
ICANN to be its partner or agentl 2 and basically handed ICANN de
facto control over the DNS.
The legal basis of the original ICANN-DOC relationship rested on
three agreements: (1) a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"),"
9. Notice, Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June
10, 1998) [hereinafter White Paper].
10. Letter from Jon Postel to Hon. William M. Daley, U.S. Sec'y of Commerce (Oct. 2,
1998),
available
at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/icann/letter.htm.
11. For details, see MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET
GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE (2002); Froomkin, supra note 4, at 8284.
12. For a discussion of the modifications and the surrounding complexities, see
MUELLER, supra note 11, at 183-208; Froomkin, supra note 4, at 82-88.
13. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE AND INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS,
http://www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm
(last updated Dec. 31, 1999)
[hereinafter MOU]. The MOU had quite a history. It was originally due to expire on
September 30, 2000. See id.; ICANN, AMENDMENT 1 TO ICANN/DOC MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING (1999), http://www.icann.org/en/nsi/amendl-jpamou-04nov99.htm
[hereinafter MOU Amendment 1]. On September 4, 2000, ICANN announced that the U.S.
Government agreed to extend ICANN's hold on the DNS for one year, or less "if ICANN
and the U.S. Government agree that the work under the MOU has been completed." ICANN
and US. Government Agree to Extend Agreements, ICANN (Sept. 4, 2000),
[hereinafter Announcement];
http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann-pr04sep00.htm
ICANN, AMENDMENT 2 TO ICANN/DOC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
(2000), http://www.icann.org/en/general/amend2-jpamou-07sepOO.htm (effective Sept. 7,
2000, generally terminates Sept. 30, 2001). This extension affected both the ICANN-DOC
MOU of November 25, 1998, see MOU, supra, and ICANN's Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement (ICANN, COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ICANN AND US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, http://
www.icann.org/committees/dns-root/crada.htm (last updated Mar. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
CRADA]). In addition, ICANN reported that the DOC extended ICANN's no-fee contract
to run the Internet Assigned Number Authority ("IANA"): the IANA contract extension
results from ICANN's acceptance of a new provision in the contract allowing the U.S.
Government unilaterally to extend the period of performance by up to six months.
Announcement, supra. That mostly set a pattern of repeated extensions, sometimes with
modifications, of the three agreements. Thus, MOU Amendment 3 (ICANN, AMENDMENT
(2001),
UNDERSTANDING
OF
MEMORANDUM
3
TO
ICANN/DOC
[hereinafter
MOU
http://www.icann.org/en/general/amend3-jpamou-25may0l1.htm
Amendment 3] (effective May 25, 2001)), followed by MOU Amendment 4 (ICANN,
AMENDMENT 4 TO ICANN/DOC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2001),
http://www.icann.org/en/general/amend4-jpamou-24sepOl.htm (effective Sept. 24, 2001)
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later replaced by a Joint Project Agreement ("JPA"); (2) ICANN's
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement ("CRADA") with
the U.S. Government; 14 and (3) a contract between ICANN and the
U.S. Government for performance of the so-called IANA (Internet
Assigned Names and Numbers) function relating to the operational
management of the root zone file, and the assignment of Internet
Protocol ("IP") numbers and protocol numbers."
Over the course of the past decade, each of these agreements was
amended numerous times; the amendments gradually gave ICANN
more authority and more independence. Full independence from the

(terms of Section VII extended until Sept. 30, 2002)), followed by MOU Amendment 5
(ICANN, AMENDMENT 5 TO ICANN/DOC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
(2002), http://www.icann.org/en/general/amend5-jpamou-19sepO2.htm (effective Sept. 19,
2002) (termination date of Sept. 30, 2003)), then MOU Amendment 6, (ICANN,
AMENDMENT 6 TO ICANN/DOC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2003),
(effective Sept. 17, 2003)
http://www.icann.org/en/generalamend6-jpamou-17sep03.htm
(replaces § VII; termination date of Sept. 30, 2006)). The MOU was then replaced by the
Joint Project Agreement. JOINT PROJECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE AND THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
NUMBERS (2006) (effective Sept. 29, 2006) (due to terminate Sept. 30, 2009) [hereinafter
JPA]. The JPA ended with the Affirmation.
14. See CRADA, supra note 13, Amendment 1 to CRADA (ICANN, AMENDMENT 1
(2000),
AGREEMENT
DEVELOPMENT
AND
RESEARCH
COOPERATIVE
TO
(extending
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/dns-root/amendl-crada-07sepOO.htm
CRADA for one year)), and Amendment 2 to CRADA (ICANN, AMENDMENT 2 TO
(2001),
AGREEMENT
DEVELOPMENT
AND
RESEARCH
COOPERATIVE
(extending
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/dns-root/amend2-crada-28sepOl.htm
CRADA for nine months)); see also ICANN, PUBLIC SUMMARY OF REPORTS PROVIDED
UNDER COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
2003),
14,
(Mar.
COMMERCE
OF
DEPARTMENT
AND
US
ICANN
http://www.icann.org/en/general/crada-report-summary-14mar03.htm.
A CRADA is usually an agreement in which
[t]he collaborating partner agrees to provide resources that may consist of funds,
personnel, services, facilities, equipment or other resources needed to conduct a
specific research or development effort while the Federal [government] agrees to
provide similar resources but no direct funding to the partner. . .. The CRADA
vehicle provides incentives that help speed the commercialization of Federallydeveloped technology[, making it an excellent technology transfer tool].
WILDLIFE
SERVICE,
FISH
AND
U.S.
and CRADA's,
Patents, Licenses,
http://www.fws.gov/techtransfer/Level-2_folder/2_Patents.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
15. Contract Between ICANN and the United States Government for Performance of
the IANA Function (Mar. 17, 2003), http://www.icann.org/en/generalliana-contract17marO3.htm [hereinafter IANA Contract] (includes three options to extend until Mar. 31,
of Contract (Aug. 28, 2003),
2006); Amendment of Solicitation/Modification
http://www.icann.org/en/general/iana-contract-02sepO3.pdf, Letter from Joel L. Perlroth,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, to Paul Twomey, ICANN, Preliminary Notification of the
Governments [sic] Intent to Extend the Term of Contract No. DG1335-03-SE-0336 (Aug.
1, 2003); U.S. Dept. of Commerce Award/Contract to ICANN, § C.4.1 (Aug. 11, 2006),
http://www.icann.org/en/generaViana-contract-14aug06.pdf (includes four options to extend
until Sept. 30, 2011). On LANA see Introducing LIANA, IANA, http://www.iana.org/about
(last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
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U.S. was clearly ICANN's goal. But the U.S. retained leverage over
ICANN for a number of reasons. Some were contractual and are
discussed below. Others were political or institutional. Of these, likely
the most important was the role played by Network Solutions, Inc.
("NSI," now VeriSign),' 6 a private for-profit company that had made a
fortune selling domain names, especially in the .com domain for which it
served as registry and first monopoly, and then primary, and then primus
interpares registrar. The actual root zone file" (sometimes abbreviated as
"the root") was and is housed on a computer run by NSI/VeriSign, not
ICANN, seemingly a source of some heartburn in ICANN headquarters.
ICANN had a long and sometimes adversarial relationship with
NSI/VeriSign. At best, the relationship was certainly arms-length. This
allowed the U.S. Government significant leverage: there was, at the end
of the day, little chance that someone at NSI/VeriSign would take orders
from ICANN if the U.S. Government told them not to.
The MOU was repeatedly amended during its life.'" Ultimately in
September 2006, the DOC and ICANN rebadged the MOU as a "Joint
Project Agreement." By that point, ICANN's obligations to perform
specific work items was much reduced." In contrast, however, the legal
relationship between ICANN and the U.S. was not that different from
what it had been, and ICANN continued to press for full independence.
While the U.S. Government may have had some concerns about its legal
authority to cut ICANN free, the political ramifications of being accused
of "losing" the Internet20 likely loomed larger. Despite this, ICANN's

16. In 2000, NSI was acquired by VeriSign, Inc. Company History, NETWORK
SOLUTIONS, http://about-networksolutions.com/corporate-history.php (last visited Nov. 9,
2010). In 2003, VeriSign sold NSI's registrar business, which resumed operations as NSI;
VeriSign remained in the registry business. Id. See also infra note 77 (further details of
NSI/VeriSign relationship).
17. A zone file is a plain text file that describes-and, if it is authoritative (i.e. relied on
by most others), effectively defines-a layer of the hierarchical domain name structure of the
DNS. The zone file contains mappings between names and IP addresses and other resources.
The root zone file is the master definition for the DNS and contains the authoritative list of
top-level domains and the information needed to find the authoritative domain name servers
for each domain name. The procedure for adding any TLD to the Internet that most of us use
is to add a single line to the root zone file containing the name of the new TLD, the address of
the computer that has the authoritative information about that domain's registry, and a few
items of technical data. For the full technical details, see Memorandum from P. Mockapetris
to Internet Engineering Task Force Network Working Group, Domain Names at
available
1987),
5
(Nov.
§
Specification,
and
Implementation
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcl035.txt, and more generally, see Memorandum from P.
Mockapetris to Internet Engineering Task Force Network Working Group, Domain Names Concepts and Facilities (Nov. 1987), availableat http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcl034.txt.
18. See supra note 13.
19. CompareJPA, supra note 13, § II, with MOU, supra note 13, § V.C.
20. For an example of the sort of criticism the DOC rightly feared, see Jeremy Rabkin &
Jeffrey Eisenach, The U.S. Abandons the Internet, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2009, at A13.
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case for independence continued to gather steam.
ICANN's formal arguments rested in part on commitments in the
White Paper that had called ICANN into being,21 and on the various
statements from U.S. Government officials since then.22 In response to
the objectives set by the U.S., ICANN established a lengthy paper
record-sometimes
even congruent with reality--designed to
demonstrate that it was achieving each of the objectives set for it in the
MOU. And indeed, even if the objectives had not all been met on the
original short timetable, the checklist of objectives that the U.S. was
willing to say had not been achieved kept shrinking in the MOU,
amendment by amendment.
If, as explained below, the legal regime of the MOU and even the
JPA retained features entrenching the U.S. Government's residual
authority,23 that same authority was under increasing assault in the
international political realm. Non-U.S. governments and interest groups
increasingly asked why it should be that the U.S. Government should
have a uniquely controlling position in the DNS. Where once the bulk of
Internet users had been in the U.S. and perhaps a handful of other
countries, now the Internet was increasingly global. Influential voices in
the European Union and Japan, soon joined by others from every
continent and region, began to push for the U.S. to divest itself of its
controlling position, or for ICANN's role to be turned over to a more
international body.24
ICANN responded to the threat of the creation of a transnational
competitor (or successor) with several initiatives. The initiatives were
designed, on the one hand, to appeal to non-U.S. government and
technical constituencies, while on the other hand to not anger the U.S.
Government, on whose good will, or at least acquiescence, ICANN still
depended if it were ever to achieve its goal of independence.
ICANN opened a branch office in Brussels, where the European
21. The U.S. Government originally suggested that the transition to full private control
of the DNS should be completed no later than September 30, 2000. White Paper, supra note
9, at 31,744. ("The U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be complete before the
year 2000. To the extent that the new corporation is established and operationally stable,
September 30, 2000 is intended to be, and remains, an 'outside' date.").
22. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 31 n.43 (collecting contradictory statements by U.S.
Government officials).
23. See infra Part I.B.2 (describing ways in which the U.S. retained limited ability to
exercise authority over the root).
24. E.g.,
Changes Loom for ICANN, TERRA DAILY (Sept. 27, 2009),
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/Changes loom forICANN_999.html
(reporting that
European Commissioner Viviane Reding stated that Europeans expect to see ICANN become
a "fully independent organization, accountable to the global Internet community" because "it is
not defendable that the government department of only one country has oversight of an
internet function which is used by hundreds of millions of people in countries all over the
world[J").
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Commission has its headquarters. 25 ICANN revamped its country-code
TLD ("ccTLD") operations to remove some of the practices that had
most irritated foreign governments.2 6 It also supported every foreign
government that sought to take over its own domestic ccTLD, whether
or not this move was opposed by the incumbent-a policy likely at odds
with earlier Internet norms.27
More importantly, ICANN gradually expanded the role of its
Government Advisory Committee. ICANN's GAC began in 1998 as an
advisory organ consisting of one representative of each participating
national government, and selected international governmental
organizations. 28 The ICANN Board, when considering decisions that
"substantially affect the operation of the Internet or third parties," was to
provide notice to the GAC for comment, 29 and to consider the GAC's
comments before making a final decision. 0 From the start, membership
was open to all national governments and also to international
organizations, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), when invited by the GAC or the Board."
In 2002, new ICANN Bylaws expanded the GAC's powers
considerably: in the event of a conflict between a GAC "comment" and
the Board's decision, the Bylaws mandated negotiation towards mutual
resolution.32 However, the Board maintained the power to take action
notwithstanding conflicting advice, so long as its reasoning was included
in the final decision." The 2002 Bylaws further gave the GAC unilateral
power to directly recommend Board action.34 Furthermore, comments

25. ICANN opened its Brussels office in 2003. See Adopted Resolutions from ICANN
Board Meeting, ICANN (Nov. 22, 2006), http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions22nov06.htm. It also opened an office in Sydney in 2006. See id.
26. See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INDUSTRY, WORKING PARTY ON
TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SERVICES POLICIES, EVOLUTION IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF COUNTRY CODE TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN NAMES (ccTLDs) (2006).
27. See Peter K. Yu, The Neverending ccTLD Story, in ADDRESSING THE WORLD:
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERNET COUNTRY CODE DOMAINS 1, 3-4 (Erica S. Wass
ed., 2003); A. Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 93, 106-08 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, How ICANN Policy Is Made
2:29
AM),
(Sept.
5,
2001,
(II),
ICANNWATCH
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=01/09/05/072945&node=thread.
28. ICANN,
BYLAWS
art.
VII
§
3(a)
(Nov.
6,
1998),
http://www.icann.org/en/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-06nov98.htm.
29. Id. art. VII § 3(a), art. III § 3(b).
30. Id. art. VII § 3(a).
3
(a)
(May
27,
1999),
art.
VII
§
31. ICANN,
BYLAWS
http://www.icann.org/en/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-27may99.htm.
2002),
§§
2(1)(i)-(j)
(Dec.
15,
BYLAWS
art.
XI
32. ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-15decO2.htm.
33. Id. art. XI § 2(1)(k).
34. Id. art. XI § 2(1)(i).
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could now be solicited by the GAC from external sources on
recommendation by the GAC or decision by the Board." The GAC was
given further representation in ICANN governance through
participation in Board meetings,3 6 the Generic Names Supporting
Organization policy recommendations, 7 and the country-code Names
Supporting Organization.38 Its presence in management was solidified
through its exemption from forced removal procedures.39
In enhancing the GAC's power, ICANN achieved a trifecta. It
made friends in foreign governments and created constituencies in the
ministries that sent delegates to ICANN GAC meetings. Often these
and thus internal
ministries were commerce-and-trade-based,
competitors to the communication ministries that attended International
Telecommunications Union ("ITU") plenaries. Having a different
ministry invested in ICANN created a constituency for the proposition
that even if ICANN was not perfect, an ICANN with a strong GAC
was a good deal. Even without this piece of internal politics, many nonU.S. governments concluded that an independent ICANN was better
than the status quo in which the U.S. had a dominant role.40 Those
governments in turn became more likely to pressure the U.S. to make
good on its White Paper promise to make ICANN independent despite
the U.S. Government's subsequent vacillation and doubt.4'
Amidst all this, ICANN also began some projects designed to
increase its power and independence. For example, from an early stage
ICANN floated a trial balloon that it, not NSI/VeriSign, should control
the root servers directly.4 2 This suggestion met with more than a little
opposition, and was eventually dropped-only to resurface.43 Meanwhile,
35. Id. art. XI-A § 1(3)(a).
36. Id. art. VI §§ 9(1)(a), 9(5).
37. Id. art. X § 3(1).
38. ICANN, BYLAWS art. IX § 3(2), annex B § 5(a) (June 26, 2003),
http://www.icann.org/en/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-26junO3.htm.
39. ICANN, supra note 32, art. V1 § 11(2).
40. Cf Wolfgang Kleinwoechter, From Self-Governance to Public-PrivatePartnership: The
ChangingRole of Governments in the Management of the Internets Core Resources, 36 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1103, 1110-11 (2003).
41. Some of the U.S.'s contradictory statements are summarized in Froomkin, supra note
4, at 31 n.43.
42. See, e.g., M. STUART LYNN, PRESIDENT'S REPORT: ICANN - THE CASE FOR
REFORM (2002), http://www.icann.org/en/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm. See
also A. Michael Froomkin, IP: Where Goes ICA.NN - the Second of Two Notes,
http://www.interesting09:00),
2002,
27,
(Feb.
INTERESTING-PEOPLE
people.org/archives/interesting-people/200202/msgOO259.html; David Post, ICANN ver. 2.0
AM),
01:45
2002,
28,
(Feb.
ICANNWATCH
"Mission Creep,"
and
Jon Weinberg,
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=02/02/28/064529&mode=thread;
AM),
3:10
2001,
10,
(May
ICANNWATCH
Root,
the
with
Busy
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=01/05/10/081012&mode=thread.
43. See infra note 78 (describing ICANN suggestion that it should have sole control over
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ICANN started to explore whether it could become a true international
organization like the ITU, the Universal Postal Union, or WIPO. From
the outside it is difficult to gauge just how serious ICANN was about
transmogrifying into a Geneva-based multinational organization, or
whether this was just a bargaining chip to persuade the U.S. to reduce its
ties. In 2006, ICANN's President's Strategy Committee took up the
question of whether ICANN's "ability to scale internationally" was being
harmed by "its legal personality being based in a specific jurisdiction.
In its 2007 Final Report, that same committee "encourage[d] the
ICANN Board to explore with the U.S. Government, other
governments, and the ICANN community, whether there are advantages
and appropriate mechanisms for moving ICANN's legal identity to that
of a private international organization based in the U.S." 45 And it further
"encourage[d] the Board to consider .. . the benefits of the international
private organization model and its related potential immunities to limit
liabilities or instabilities." 46 From ICANN's viewpoint, the prospect of
international status certainly seemed to offer everything that ICANN's
critics feared ICANN most wanted: immunity from suit in the U.S.,
international stature, a lack of outside supervision and control, no need to
have a 'membership' or file California and U.S. tax returns,47 not to
mention all the international travel a body could stand. On the other
hand, the chances of achieving such stature without an international
agreement, especially without U.S. blessing, were slim at best. Although
non-U.S. governments were not happy with the status quo, nor with the
U.S.'s very slow approach to changing it, there was never any sign that
they were prepared to support a move by ICANN to abandon its U.S.
base in the face of opposition from the DOC.

the keys used to sign the root).
44. President'sStrategy Committee Consultationwith the ICANN Community Improving the
ICANN,
Model,
Multi-stakeholder
of
the
Strength
Inherent
(last modified Aug. 13,
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/psc-consultation-en.htm
2010).
45. ICANN, FINAL PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY COMMITIEE REPORT 3 (2007).
46. Id. at 5.
47. The President's Strategy Committee commissioned Ambassador Hans Corell, the
former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and a former Legal Counsel of the United
Nations, to produce a report on the international status option. See ICANNMeetings in Lisbon
Portugal: Transcript - President's Strategy Committee Workshop, ICANN (Mar. 28, 2007),
http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/lisbon/transcript-psc-28mar07.htm. Ambassador Corell's
report is published at Hans Corell, Educational Material to Assist ICANN in Deciding What
Status the Corporation Should Aim for as a Private InternationalEntity in Its Host Country,
ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/psc/corell-24aug06.html (last modified Aug. 13, 2010).
Ambassador Corell's report emphasized a proposed Swiss law granting special privileges and
immunities to international organizations, including "international quasi governmental
organisation[s]" and "other international organisms," having Switzerland as their host State.
Id. § 7.
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This quick survey of a very tangled set of relationships sets the scene
for the Affirmation of Commitments.

B.

Key Aspects of the Affirmation

"U.S. Cedes ICANN Control to the World" read the headline at
Internetnews.com.4 8 Both ICANN and the DOC trumpeted the
Affirmation of Commitments as a major milestone. The DOC's official
statement said,
Today's announcement bolsters the long-term viability of the
Internet as a force for innovation, economic growth, and freedom of
expression .... This framework puts the public interest front and
center, and it establishes processes for stakeholders around the world
to review ICANN's performance. The Affirmation of Commitments
also reinforces a long-standing relationship between ICANN and the
Department of Commerce. The Department looks forward to
playing an active role along with other stakeholders in ensuring that
ICANN is successful, accountable, and transparent. 49
The Affirmation is consistent with public comments submitted to
NTIA earlier this year that reflected strong support for the model of
multi-stakeholder, private-sector-led coordination of the DNS that
ICANN represents, but also expressed continuing concerns about
ICANN's transparency and accountability in decision-making.so
Yet, from a legal standpoint, the Affirmation of Commitments is,
on the whole, quite vacuous. Indeed, the Affirmation's greatest
significance may lie in what it is not.
1.

What's There

The most important aspect of the Affirmation appears in its first
paragraph: the Affirmation recognizes the lapsing of the JPA-and
unlike the many amendments to the MOU that preceded it, this time
ICANN and the DOC were not extending the agreement. Instead, in
48. Sean

Michael

Kerner,

U.S.

Cedes

ICANN

Control

to

the

World,

INTERNETNEWS.COM
(Sept.
30,
2009),
http://www.internetnews.com/infra/article.php/3841671/US+Cedes+ICANN+Control+to+th
e+World.htm.

49. Press Release, Nat'1 Telecomms. and Info. Admin., Commerce's NTIA and ICANN
Establish a Long-Lasting Framework for the Technical Coordination of the Internet's
(Sept.
30,
2009),
Addressing
System
Domain
Name
and
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press/2009/ICANNAffirmation_090930.html.
50. Id. (emphasis in original).
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the subsequent sections ICANN and the DOC recited some
commitments. The parties described those commitments in broad and
ringing terms:
This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN,
including commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions made related to
the global technical coordination of the DNS are made in the public
interest and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security,
stability and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition,
consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and
(d) facilitate international participation in DNS technical
coordination. 5
Sounds great. But, in fact, the DOC didn't really promise anything
enforceable, and neither, in the main, did ICANN. Indeed, from a
strictly legal viewpoint there is a case to be made that whatever the
Affirmation is, it is not a contract as there is no exchange of
consideration. Rather, it is a repetition of things the parties had, in the
main, previously said they were already doing. Arguably, the DOC's
allowing the JPA to lapse could be seen as a form of consideration for
ICANN's binding itself to its promises, but since the JPA would have
lapsed without both parties extending it, and it's unclear where the DOC
gets the statutory authority to enter into a contract such as the
Affirmation, this seems odd consideration at best.
a.

DOC's Promises

The Affirmation contains no binding promises by the U.S.
Government. Given the history of the agreements it replaced, which
consisted of commitments almost solely by ICANN, the absence of
explicit statutory authority for the DOC's management of ICANN and
of the root, and the equal nonexistence of any formal rulemaking or
adjudicatory process, it is hardly surprising that the U.S. Government
was not in a position to promise much.
Instead, the DOC "affirm[ed] its commitment" to the Internet
equivalent of Motherhood, "a multi-stakeholder, private sector led,
bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical coordination
that acts for the benefit of global Internet users."52 The DOC also
affirmed its commitment to the GAC and (in principle, subject to more
on the details) to multinational character sets for internationalized
TLDs.13

51. AFFIRMATION, supra note 1,

52. Id. 4.
53. Id. It 4-6.

3.
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And that's it. The rest of the Affirmation consists of statements
about what ICANN will do.

b.

ICANN's Promises

ICANN makes some sweeping promises in the Affirmation.
ICANN promises:
to adhere to transparent and accountable budgeting processes,
fact-based policy development, cross-community deliberations, and
responsive consultation procedures that provide detailed explanations
of the basis for decisions, including how comments have influenced
the development of policy consideration[;] ... to provide a thorough
and reasoned explanation of decisions taken, the rationale thereof and
the sources of data and information on which ICANN relied[;] 54
[to] remain a not for profit corporation, headquartered in the United
States of America with offices around the world to meet the needs of
a global community; .. . to operate as a multi-stakeholder, private

sector led organization with input from the public, for whose benefit
ICANN shall in all events act[;]. . . to maintain and improve
robust mechanisms for public input, accountability, and transparency
so as to ensure that the outcomes of its decision-making will reflect
the public interest and be accountable to all stakeholders . ...5
These are significant-sounding commitments about almost every
aspect of ICANN's operations. Fully realized, they would likely defang
all but the most overly zealous or nationalistic of ICANN's critics. But
any jaundiced veteran of the DNS wars will immediately notice two
things about this list: almost nothing on this list is new, and none of it is
enforceable.
All but one of these commitments could have been lifted from any
of a number of previous similar documents that ICANN has produced.
With the exception of its explicit promise to stay headquartered in the
USA-which is significant"5 -ICANN not only has made these or
similar commitments many times in the past," it has also congratulated

Id. 7.
Id. 8.
Id. 9.1.
See infra text accompanying notes 120-20.
See, e.g., Accountability and Transparency Frameworks and Principles:Accountability in
the
Public
Sphere,
ICANN
(Feb.
15,
2008),
http://www.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/public-sphere.htm
(explaining
ICANN's role in performing a public trust function); Accountability and Transparency
Frameworks and Principles: Legal and Corporate Accountability, ICANN (Feb. 15, 2008),
http://www.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm
(discussing the legal and corporate accountability ICANN has under the legal system and its
Bylaws); Accountability and Transparency Frameworks and Principles: Accountability to the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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itself for making good on these or similar objectives.59 Anyone concerned
(with reason)60 that perhaps ICANN is not as open and transparent as it
has consistently claimed will find little comfort in a reiteration of those
promises-although there is always hope when management changes. 61
Many of ICANN's commitments in the Affirmation turn out to be
less than they might seem. For example, the promise "to maintain and
improve robust mechanisms for public input, accountability, and
transparency so as to ensure that the outcomes of its decision-making
will reflect the public interest and be accountable to all stakeholders" 62
turns out to have four sub-parts describing implementation. Each of
these sub-parts commits ICANN to actions with words like "assessing
and

improving,"

"assessing . . .

and

making

recommendations,"

"continually assessing and improving," and "continually assessing. "63 As if
that were not enough, ICANN commits to "organize a review of its
execution of the above commitments no less frequently than every three
years" 64 to make sure that all the assessing and improving is proceeding.
ICANN also undertook to issue "an annual report that sets out
ICANN's progress against ICANN's bylaws, responsibilities, and
strategic and operating plans[,]"6 ' and to report on an ongoing basis
regarding "the positive and negative effects of its decisions on the public,
including any financial impact on the public, and the positive or negative
impact (if any) on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the
DNS."66 This example is drawn from paragraph 9.1 of the Affirmation,
but the commitments in paragraphs 9.2 ("Preserving security, stability
Participating
Community,
ICANN
(Feb.
15,
2008),
(asserting
http://icann.org/en/accountabiity/frameworks-principles/community.htm
ICANN's accountability to the public at large); see also ICANN, ACCOUNTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORKS AND PRINCIPLES (2008) (discussing how ICANN's various

types of accountability support its operating model); ONE WORLD TRUST, INDEPENDENT
REVIEW OF ICANN'S ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY - STRUCTURES AND
PRACTICES (2007) (evaluating ICANN's standards of accountability and transparency against
other international organizations).
59. E.g., KIERAN MCCARTHY, LEAVING REPORT OF GENERAL MANAGER OF
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (2009).
60. To pick just the most obvious example, most ICANN Board meetings are held in
secret, are not recorded, and the public is given corporate-style summaries of its actions some
days later. When the ICANN Board has a public meeting, it first meets in secret in advance to
discuss the issues that will come up in public. Cf John Palfrey, The End ofthe Experiment: How
ICANN's Foray Into Global Internet Democracy Failed, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH 409, 437-47
(2004).
61. Rod Beckstrom took over as ICANN President and CEO on July 1, 2009. See, e.g.,
Rod Beckstrom, President and CEO, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/biog/beckstrom.htm
(last modified Aug. 13, 2010).
62. AFFIRMATION, supra note 1, 9.1.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. 7.
66. Id. 4.
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and resiliency") and 9.3 ("Promoting competition, consumer trust, and
consumer choice") are little different."
The means by which the triennial assessment teams will be
constituted does say something about where ICANN sees its future. The
teams will be made up of ex officio members and "volunteer community
members" selected by ICANN's Board Chair and the Chair of the
GAC. 5 It is possible that the triennial assessments may matter, because
delivery of the reports will provide an occasion for ICANN to agenda
their recommendations. Indeed, in the Affirmation, ICANN promises
that "[t]he Board will take action within six months of receipt of the
recommendations."69 Of course that's carefully vague as to what sort of
action the Board might take; it is certainly not a promise to agree with
the teams or implement their recommendations.
One thing is clear: in contrast with the MOU and JPS regime, no
more will ICANN's reports be directed to DOC." Whatever its practical
import, this is high symbolism, marred only a little by the guarantee that
the DOC will have an ex officio seat among the members of one of the
four report-writing teams.
67. A few differences between these sections are noted infra note 71.
68. On the GAC, see supra text accompanying notes 28-41. The current chair is Mr.
Janis Karklins of Latvia. Elected Officers, GAC, http://gac.icann.org/elected-officers (last
visited Nov. 6, 2010). Former chairs were Sharil Tarmizi of Malaysia who served from 20022006 and Paul Twomey of Australia, 1999-2002. Id. Following his stint at the GAC, Mr.
Twomey served as ICANN President and CEO from March 2003 to June 2009. Paul
Twomey, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/biog/twomey.htm (last modified Aug. 13, 2010).
69. AFFIRMATION, supra note 1, 1 9.1-9.3.
70. ICANN President and CEO Beckstrom seemed to see this as particularly significant:
But there's no separate or unique or separate reporting to the United States
government. All the reporting is to the world; that's the real change. Under the JPA
the reporting was just to the U.S. government, and some of it was handled publicly,
and now all the reporting is global.
ICANN CEO Talks About the New Affirmation of Commitments, ICANN (Sept. 30, 2009),
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-30sepO9-en.htm.
71. This provision is unique to 9.1:
[T]he review team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will
include the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the
Chair of the Board of ICANN, the Assistant Secretary for Communications and
Information of the DOC, representatives of the relevant ICANN Advisory
Committees and Supporting Organizations and independent experts. Composition
of the review team will be agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation
with GAC members) and the Chair of the Board of ICANN.
AFFIRMATION, supra note 1,
9.1. In contrast, in
9.2 the composition of the team is
broader:
The review will be performed by volunteer community members and the review
team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will include the
following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the CEO of
ICANN, representatives of the relevant Advisory Committees and Supporting
Organizations, and independent experts. Composition of the review team will be
agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GAC members) and
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Symbolism may indeed be the strongest affirmative characteristic of
the Affirmation: nothing in the Affirmation, nor anything else ICANN
has said on the subject, suggests that any of these promises are
enforceable by the U.S. Government, much less by an interested third
party. The Affirmation can be terminated by either party on 120 days
notice. But since the MOU and the JPA are no more, termination is an
empty threat-there's nothing to revert to if the Affirmation bites the
dust. As Rod Beckstrom noted, "The Affirmation is effectively a
perpetual agreement.""
2.

What's Not There

The most interesting aspects of the Affirmation are not what it says,
but rather the parts of ICANN's relationship with the U.S. that are not
addressed explicitly. Some remain unchanged; for others the change in
political relations symbolized by the Affirmation may make a difference.
And, in one case, the lapse of the MOU/JPA regime creates a legal
opening for ICANN to further liberate itself from any threat the U.S.
Government might make to displace it.
Final authority over changes to the root zone file. The root zone file
is a simple text document that, because it is copied and relied on by
others, defines which TLDs are visible to most users on the Internet and
defines which registry controls registrations in each of those domains.74
Prior to the Affirmation, the U.S. Government, not ICANN, had final
authority over changes to the key root zone file. The physical root zone
file resides on a computer controlled by VeriSign (formerly NSI), a U.S.
Government contractor." The contractual relationship between the U.S.
and NSI/VeriSign was itself fraught with conflict, but while the U.S.
Government generally prodded NSI/VeriSign to cooperate with and
even obey ICANN, there was one key exception. As spelled out in
Amendment 11 to the U.S.-NSI contract, NSI (as it then was called)
the CEO of ICANN.
9.2. Likewise, in 9.3:
The reviews will be performed by volunteer community members and the review
team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will include the
following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the CEO of
ICANN, representatives of the relevant Advisory Committees and Supporting
Organizations, and independent experts. Composition of the review team will be
agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GAC members) and
the CEO of ICANN.
Id. 9.3.
72. Id. 11.
73. ICANN CEO Talks About the New Affirmation of Commitments, supra note 70.
74. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 43-44.
75. As noted above, at times the contractor has been known as VeriSign and at times as
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI). See supra text accompanying note 16.
Id.
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could not change the root file on ICANN's instructions without a
counter-signature from a federal official:
While NSI continues to operate the primary root server, it shall
request written direction from an authorized USG official before
making or rejecting any modifications, additions or deletions to the
root zone file. Such direction will be provided within ten (10)
working days and it may instruct NSI to process any such changes
directed by [ICANN] when submitted to NSI in conformity with
written procedures established by [ICANN] and recognized by the
USG.x,
In other words, before the Affirmation, if ICANN wanted to add,
change, or remove a TLD, it needed the DOC's permission, or at least
acquiescence. Nothing in the Affirmation changes that,n and it remains
true unless the U.S. amends its contract with VeriSign, or if the technical
means by which the root zone file is authenticated change in a way that
makes ICANN the only party controlling the cryptographic certification
process. 78

76. Special Award Conditions, NCR-9218742, Amendment No. 11, available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/docnsil00698.htm (Oct. 7, 1998)
[hereinafter Amendment 11]. As ICANN had not formally been recognized by the DOC at
the time the DOC entered into this agreement with NSI, ICANN was identified only as
"NewCo" in Amendment 11.
77. In 2000, NSI was acquired by VeriSign, Inc. Company History, NETWORK
SOLUTIONS, http://about-nerworksolutions.com/corporate-history.php (last visited Nov. 6,
2010). The Cooperative Agreement remained in effect between the DOC and VeriSign.
ICANN, AMENDMENT 24 TO COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN NSI AND U.S.
GOVERNMENT
(2001),
http://www.icann.org/en/nsi/coopagmt-amend24-25may0l.htm
(amending Section I(A)(4) of Amendment 19) ('"NSI' refers to Network Solutions, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of VeriSign, Inc., and its successors and assigns. From the date of
execution of this amendment, the Cooperative Agreement will refer to 'VeriSign' as the nongovernment party to this agreement."). No subsequent amendments have expressly changed
the Amendment 11 provision. The root responsibilities of Amendment 11 have been referred
to in other subsequent contracts, which is evidence of their continued validity at least as late as
August, 2006. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Commerce Award/Contract to ICANN, supra note 15,
§ C.4.1 ("This purchase order, in itself, does not authorize modifications, additions, or
deletions to the root zone file or associated information. (This purchase order does not alter
root system responsibilities as set forth in Amendment 11 of the Cooperative Agreement
NCR-9218742 between the DOC and VeriSign, Inc.)").
78. Subsequent to the Silicon Flatirons Conference, ICANN altered the procedure for
authenticating-and thus, perforce, for changing-the content of the root. ICANN generates,
and uses, the Key Signing Key ("KSK"), while VeriSign generates/uses the Zone Signing Key
("ZSK"). See JOE ABLEY ET AL., ROOT DNSSEC ROOT DESIGN TEAM, DNSSEC ROOT
ZONE HIGH LEVEL TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE 2 Fig. 1 (2010). ICANN originally
proposed to manage the whole DNSSEC procedure for the root, including editing, signing,
and publishing the zone file. See ICANN, ICANN PROPOSAL TO DNSSEC-SIGN THE
ROOT ZONE (2008). VeriSign objected to this plan. See Brenden Kuerbis, ICANN's DNSSEC
Root Signing Proposal D.O.A.?, INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT BLOG (Oct. 3, 2008,
1:57
PM),
http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2008/10/3/3899192.html;
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U.S. Government power to make a unilateral change in the root. A
re-delegation of a TLD is a change in control (from one registry to
another) of the master file that defines who is registered in it. Redelegations are by no means unheard of among the ccTLDs. Since the
registry that controls a TLD's master database has in effect total power
over who can register in it, ICANN has a moderately involved process,
run through its IANA subsidiary, for determining whether to accept a
re-delegation application." The process for re-delegating a ccTLD
involves a period of consultation with local stakeholders, although oddly
the process is not very public. Even so, it is far from instantaneous.
In 2001, the U.S. Government decided to put the Neustar
Corporation in charge of the .us ccTLD. The change was not especially
controversial by ICANN standards, but it happened in a very rushed
manner and bypassed the usual IANA procedures," thus demonstrating
the U.S. Government's unilateral power over the root." Nothing has
formally changed as a result of the Affirmation that would alter the U.S.
Government's ability to order or persuade VeriSign to insert a change
into the root without a recommendation from ICANN (acting through
IANA). On the other hand, the U.S. Government's participation in the
Affirmation, and especially its statements about ICANN's
independence,82 may be seen as a promise not to take any such action.13
Plus, the one example of U.S. unilateralism in this arena relates to the .us
TLD. As many governments see management of the ccTLD bearing
their country code as something that is or should be primarily an internal
VERISIGN, INC., ROOT ZONE SIGNING PROPOSAL (2008). The NTIA ultimately chose not
to give ICANN the sole power to define the root. See NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO.
ADMIN., TESTING AND IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INITIAL
DEPLOYMENT OF DNSSEC IN THE AUTHORITATIVE ROOT ZONE (2009). The critical
point for current purposes is that ICANN cannot act unilaterally; it must still get cooperation
from an outside party-here, VeriSign-to make changes in the root.
79. See generally Understandingthe ccTLD Delegation and Redelegation Procedure, IANA
for the current
(Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.iana.org/domains/root/delegation-guide,
procedures.
80. See Redelegation of.us Country-Code Top-Level Domain, ICANN (Nov. 19, 2001),
(admitting
that
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-19nov0l.htm
"redelegation occurred before the completion of the normal IANA requirements").
Interestingly, that announcement also promised that "[a] full IANA report will be posted as
soon as it is complete." Id. But, as of October 2010, 1 have not been able to find the report and
am told it was never released. Another peculiarity is that the ITU's account of the transition,
based on information provided by the U.S. Government, completely glosses over the issue. See
INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, US RE-DELEGATION CASE STUDY (2003), available at
http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/workshop/cctld/cctld037 ww9.doc.
81. See generally Marc Schneiders & Simon Higgs, Root Fix for the .US Top Level
Domain (Mar. 2002) (working paper), available at http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-higgsschneiders-root-fix-us-00.txt.
82. See supra text accompanying note 50.
83. Cf infra Part II.D (discussing national security considerations relating to control of
the root).
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matter, 84 the precedent set may be of little value were the U.S. to try
similar tactics with any other non-proprietary TLD in the future.
The U.S. Government's reversionary interest in ICANN's
contracts with key third parties. The MOU specified that the U.S.
Government kept the right to replace ICANN, and if it did,
NSI/VeriSign, the other registrars, and the other registries-the people
who run the mechanics of the DNS-must terminate their relationships
with ICANN, thus allowing them to substitute the Government's new
choice.ss In furtherance of this duty, ICANN's early standard contract
with, for example, registries, terminated if ever the DOC "withdraws its
recognition of ICANN.""6 There is, however, no evidence that the
Government ever contemplated using this nuclear option or even
threatened to do so. These contractual terms between ICANN and
others remain in effect after the Affirmation, although there remains no
way other than perhaps terminating the Affirmation itself for the U.S. to
"withdraw its recognition of ICANN." Furthermore, there appears to be
no reason why ICANN could not, if it chose, amend its standard form
agreement to remove the clause, and gradually amend the agreements in
place as they come up for renewal. The lapse of the U.S. Government's
pre-existing ability to credibly threaten to replace ICANN and force it to
assign its contracts with the registries and registrars may be the most
significant legal consequence of the Affirmation.
The IANA Agreement is a separate agreement from the MOU.
Many of ICANN's most important powers-such as the ability to redelegate domains and its control over IP number block allocationsderived not from the MOU but from a separate, most peculiar, purchase
order by which ICANN contracted to provide the "IANA function" to
the U.S. Government for an annual fee of SO." The IANA agreement is
unaffected by the Affirmation. The current version of the IANA

84. Cf A. Michael Froomkin, When We Say US w We Mean It!, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 839
(2004).
85. See MOU Amendment 3, supra note 13, § IV ("If the DOC withdraws its
recognition of ICANN or any successor entity by terminating this MOU, ICANN agrees that
it will assign to the DOC any rights that ICANN has in all existing contracts with the
registries and registrars, including any data escrow agreement(s) between VeriSign and
ICANN with respect to the .com, .net, and .org registries."). See also MOU, supra note 13, §
VII; MOU Amendment 1, supra note 13, § 3.
86. ICANN,
ICANN-NSI
REGISTRY
AGREEMENT
24
(1999),
http://www.icann.org/en/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-04nov99.htm ("In the event that, prior to
the expiration or termination of this Agreement under Section 14 or 16(B), the United States
Department of Commerce withdraws its recognition of ICANN as NewCo under the
Statement of Policy pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 5 of Amendment 1 (dated
November 10, 1999) to the Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the
Department of Commerce, this Agreement shall terminate.").
87. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 86.
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agreement is due to expire in 2011," and there has been no word on
whether it will be extended, amended, or allowed to die a quiet death. So
long as the agreement remains in force, however, the U.S. retains the
ability to threaten, albeit less credibly than before, to shift those powers
to a different organization if ever ICANN does something so weird or
dangerous that the U.S. felt moved to try to wrest control from it."
C.

What theAffirmation Tells Us About ICANN's Legal Status and
About Its Future

The Affirmation suggests that one of the many competing
explanations for ICANN's status is in ascendency. In Wrong Turn in
Cyberspace I described twin narratives put forth by ICANN and the
DOC. One was the "standard-setting story"" in which ICANN did not
make policy or political decisions, but only proclaimed standards set by a
bottom-up consensus process and then implemented them." Another
was the "private party story"-ICANN described as a not-for-profit
California corporation genuinely created spontaneously without
involvement of Ira Magaziner or other federal officials.92 This private
body, it was said, made its decisions independently, without overt or tacit
instructions from the U.S. Government. A large number of ICANN's
actions might have been designed to fulfill the objectives set in the White
Paper-a mere government policy statement, and thus one with no legal
force-but that was because those were good policies and ICANN
believed in them. I contrasted these stories with competing critical
88. U.S. Dept. of Commerce Award/Contract to ICANN, supra note 15.
89. What exactly would happen if the U.S. were to attempt to assign the IANA function
to a new body is a slightly complicated question. On the one hand, if the U.S. had the
authority to enter into the IANA agreement with ICANN, then it ought logically to have the
same authority to enter into a successor agreement with some other party. On the other hand,
IANA's most important functions depend on the consent and cooperation of many third
parties who all agree to treat IANA's decisions as authoritative. Thus, with regard to the IP
numbering function for example, any new IANA's ability to do anything would depend in
large part on being recognized by the five Regional Internet Registries ("RIRs"). See infra text
accompanying note 139.
90. Froomkin, supra note 4, at 35.
91. The counter- narrative here is that the focus on "bottom-up" process is often a sham.
E.g.,
Although ICANN likes to posit itself as an organisation rooted in communities,
where policy is developed from the bottom up, this wonderfully democratic
discourse stands in rather ugly contrast to the quite questionable practices that are
all too frequently reported from the organisation (the rather stepsisterly treatment
meted out to noncommercial users in ICANN in recent times, for example,
immediately comes to mind.)
Anja Kovacs, The IC1NN-US DOC Affirmation of Commitments' - A Step Forward?,
NONCOMMERCIAL USERS CONSTITUENCY (NCUC) (Oct. 7, 2009, 4:43 AM),
http://ncdnhc.org/profiles/blogs/the-icannus-doc-affirmation-of.
92. Froomkin, supra note 4, at 34.
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narratives in which ICANN was political and in which the U.S.
Government's ability to pull the plug on ICANN, combined with signs
that the DOC might be quietly advising ICANN on policy matters,
made ICANN a candidate for state actor status.93
The Affirmation explicitly states that ICANN is a private body.94
Indeed, whatever the case a decade ago, the lapse of the MOU-JPA
certainly strengthens the case for the private party story today as regards
U.S. law, although ironically the reverse is partly true in the international
arena. ICANN achieved this domestic de-governmentalization despite
the fraying of the "standard setting story"-even ICANN's counsel
admitted long ago that ICANN does policy.95 ICANN's growing
independence from the U.S.-even if it is not yet complete-weakens, I
think fatally, the case for labeling ICANN a state actor under U.S. law in
the future.
To date, criticisms of the Affirmation have tended to focus on
accountability concerns. 6 Some argue that the lack of defined criteria
and standards of measurement for ICANN's performance are likely to
diminish the effectiveness of the review panels. 7 The power to select the
review panels is concentrated in the hands of insiders-ICANN's CEO,
the leader of the body being reviewed, chief among them. This led the
Coalition Against Domain Name Abuse to criticize the Affirmation as
making ICANN "a regulator that has been captured from within."
Others note that the review panels' recommendations are not binding,
93. See id; see also Jennifer Arenett-Mitchell, State Action Debate Reborn Again: Why the
Constitution Should Act as a Checking Mechanismfor ICANN's Uniform DisputeResolution Policy,
27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &POLY 307 (2006).
94. AFFIRMATION, supra note 1, 8 ("ICANN is a private organization").
95. See Joe Sims & Cynthia Bauerly, A Response to Professor Froomkin: Why ICANN Does
Not Violate theAPA or the Constitution, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 65, 66 (2002).
On the other hand, ICANN's official pronouncements still push the standard-setting story in
the face of all the evidence. For example, "ICANN does not create or make Internet policy.
Rather, policy is created through a bottom-up, transparent process involving all necessary
constituencies and stakeholders in the Internet Community." ICANN Factsheet, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/factsheets/fact-sheet.htmi (last modified Aug. 13, 2010).
96. E.g., R. Shawn Gunnarson, ICANN's Weak Accountability Remains a Problem,
PST),
PM
1:09
2010,
19,
(Jan
CIRCLEID
Kieren
http://www.circleid.com/posts/icanns-weak-accountability-remains-aproblem;
McCarthy, Accountability and Transparency at ICANN? Not Looking Good, KIEREN
2010),
16,
(June
[DOTCOMI
MCCARTHY
http://kierenmccarthy.com/2010/06/16/accountability-and-transparency-at-icann-notlooking-good.
97. See, e.g., Grant Gross, New ICANN Agreement Runs Into Criticism, TECHWORLD
(Oct.
2,
2009,
06:39),
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/320747/new icann-agreement-runs into-criticism.
98. Press Release, Coal. Against Domain Name Abuse, CADNA Asserts That the
ICANN
Affirmation
of
Commitments
Falls
Short
(Sept.
30,
2009),
http://www.cadna.org/en/newsroom/press-releases/iccan-affirmation-of-commitments-fallsshort.
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leaving the ICANN Board with the same decision-making autonomy it
has enjoyed since it revised its Bylaws to dispense with the need for
community consensus.99
Another line of critique has focused on who gained power as the
U.S. gave some up: the GAC and insider business interests. The GAC's
increasing ascendency is somewhat ironic as ICANN was originally
founded as a means to privatize the DNS. Version 1.0 of the ICANN
Bylaws imagined an international board, but one drawn entirely from the
private sector-government officials were not allowed to be Board
members. 1' As described above, over time ICANN allied itself with
non-U.S. governments as a way to extract the U.S. from its directly
controlling role, and also as a way to head off non-U.S. support for
alternatives to ICANN based in the ITU or the United Nations. In
ICANN's latest evolution, rather than being fully privatized, the DNS is
instead semi-internationalized.o
The role of business interests remains strong. As one perceptive
critic put it,
[W]hile ICANN may be a public interest organisation on paper, in
practice it is heavily dominated by large businesses, in particular those
US-based, who seem to be willing to go to considerable lengths to
defend their interests. The [Affirmation] has done nothing to check
these tendencies. The review panels suggested are an internal affair,
where those who develop policy will get to appoint the people who
will assess the policy development processes, and most of those
appointed, too, will come from within the organisation. While the
suggested wider involvement of ICANN communities, including
governments, in reviewing the organisation is a welcome move, it
remains to be seen, then, to what extent these review panels will have
teeth - in any case their recommendations are not binding. But some
go even further and argue that the [Affirmation] has effectively
removed the one democratic control that existed over ICANN's
Board: that of the US Government. As the communities that
supposedly make up ICANN do not have the power to unseat the
Board, the Board now is effectively accountable ... to none.10 2
Indeed, if it didn't have it before, the Affirmation now clearly gives

AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
INC.:
IGP,
ICANN,
99. MILTON MUELLER,
PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNANCE OF CRITICAL INTERNET RESOURCES 17 (2009).
100. "Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, no official of a national
government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement between
national governments may serve as a Director." ICANN, supra note 28, art. V § 5.
101. Cf Avri Doria, Post JPA: Tempered Happiness, CIRCLEID (Sept. 30, 2009, 7:36 PM
(making a similar
PST), http://w.,ww.circleid.com/posts/post-jpa.tempercd-happiness
critique).
102. Kovacs, supra note 91.
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ICANN the freedom to decide what sort of organization it wants to be.
Perhaps it will live up to its Affirmation of some very fine goals and
commitments. Yet the very process that produced the Affirmation
itself-one characterized by near-total secrecy in both drafting and
approval,o 3 followed by what appears to have been selective advance
release of the text to friendly outside parties in order to get good
press'"-suggests that ICANN's unusually limited definition of
"maximum feasible" transparency"os remains evidence of ICANN's
persisting lack of commitment to genuine transparency and
accountability.
ICANN has the freedom to change. The question is whether, now
that it is freed from many of the political constraints that have shaped, or
perhaps even deformed it, ICANN sees a need to change or is happy as it
is.106

II.

DOES THE DNS MATTER?

Ten years ago, I asserted that "[c]ontrol of the root potentially
confers substantial economic and political power."'0 o The removal of a
part of the United States's control over ICANN provides an occasion to
revisit that assertion.
It may seem odd to even address that issue at this juncture. After all,
much of the pressure that convinced the U.S. Government to relax its
hold on ICANN came from foreign allies convinced that there was
something unfair, improper, or at least unseemly about the U.S.'s
dominant role over a critical piece of an increasingly global network.
103. See Edward Hasbrouk, ICANN's New Commitment to TransparencyArrives Via Secret
Process,
ICANNWATCH
(Sept.
30,
2009,
6:59
AM),
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=09/09/30/165214.
104. "It is extremely obvious that ICANN and NTIA gave advance preview access to a
select number of cheer leading insiders in order to accumulate a nice opening day press
release." Karl Auerbach, Independent - Not So Fast, Comment to New Agreement Declares
ICAAN
Independent,
CIRCLEID
(Sept.
30,
2009,
2:49
PM
PST),
http://www.circleid.com/posts/new-agreement-declares-icann-independent/#5796.
105. "ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in
an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness."
ICANN, BYLAWS art. III § 1 (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.icann.org/en/general/archivebylaws/bylaws-30sepO9-en.htm#III.
106. A related question is whether ICANN will burnish its claims to legitimacy. On the
issue of ICANN's legitimacy, see Sebastian Botzem & Jeanette Hofmann, Transnational
Governance Spirals: The Transformation of Regulatory Authority in Internet Governance and
Corporate
Financial
Reporting
(2010)
(unpublished manuscript),
available at
http://duplox.wzb.eu/people/jeanette/pdf/BotzemHofmann_2010_draft.pdf,
Jonathan
Weinberg, Non-State Actors and Global Informal Governance -- The Case of ICANN, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE (Thomas Christiansen &
Christine
Neuhold
eds.
forthcoming
2011),
available
at
http://faculty.law.wayne.edu/Weinberg/informal.governance.chapter.revised.pdf.
107. Froomkin, supra note 4, at 21.
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Academics complained; one went so far as to bemoan "the totalitarian
control of the Internet by the United States."10 Similarly, influential
voices in the U.S. warned that to let go of the DNS would be to abandon
a unique strategic asset. For example, leading members of the House
Subcommittee on Communications Technology and the Internet wrote
to the DOC as the JPA was due to expire, requesting many of the
features that ultimately found their way into the Affirmation-and ended
by requesting "a continued role for the Department of Commerce" in
ICANN. 09
The possible risks of having a body-be it public or private-in
charge of the DNS can be grouped into four categories: (1) primarily
economic issues involving market power over DNS service providers
(registrars and registries), (2) economic power exercised over registrants
and other third parties, (3) more general political power over speech or
other uses of the Internet, and (4) geo-strategic."o Some of these, it turns
out, are much more real dangers than others.
Many of the concerns about who controls the root remain valid,
particularly those relating to the ability to shape or control the market for
domain names, and a number of trademark-related issues, or issues
arising from attempts to solve the trademark issues. But some other
worries about the DNS now seem somewhat inflated. Still others,
perhaps like the DNS itself someday, may be falling victim to technical
change.
A.

Economic and Market Power Over Domain-Name Service
Providers

Most obviously, the power to control the root includes the ability to
decide which TLDs are visible to the vast majority of Internet users who
rely on the legacy root. The power to create is also, largely, the power to
destroy. Thus, ICANN can make visible and usable-or nearly invisible
and largely useless-TLDs such as .com or .ibm. It can re-delegate a
TLD from one registry to another."'
TLDs are valuablell 2 and people want them. Further, the power to
108. Konstantinos

Komaitis,

Aristotle, Europe and Internet Governance, 21

PAC.

McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. &DEv. L.J. 57, 57 (2008).
109. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, et al.,
to Hon. Gary Locke, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Aug. 4, 2009), available at
http://internetgovernance.org/pdf/doc044-2.pdf.
110. Other issues, not considered in this paper, have to do with the specification of
technical parameters such as new character sets (IDNs), DNSSEC, and IPv6.
111. All that is required, technically, is a change to one line in the root zone file. See supra
note 17.
112. Estimates of new TLD values vary widely depending upon the TLD name, its
relationship to established TLDs, and the estimated demand for second-level registrations. See
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control TLDs can be leveraged into power over registries, and through
them registrars. ICANN has used its power to limit the number of new
TLDs, pick winners (or, some would claim, play favorites), and
determine business models and domain name market structure (in both
pro- and anti-competitive fashions). Since ICANN reserves the right to
pass on the semantic validity of names, it has also been drawn into
controversies about what terms are suitable for registration.
Controversies include ICANN's rejection of ".iii" at the eleventh hour on
the ground that it was hard to say, 1 3 and the rejection of ".xx"-a
decision subsequently found to be "not consistent with the application of
neutral, objective and fair documented policy" in an International
Chamber of Commerce arbitration held pursuant to ICANN's
Independent Review Process.114
As it creates new TLDs, ICANN has also imposed various limits on
what names they can register and to whom they can be offered. ICANN
requires new global top level domains ("gTLDs") to use a "landrush"
system in which trademark holders get first dibs on names matching
their trademarked character strings-even if the term has multiple
meanings or is generic for some other use."s It also has a list of reserved
words, primarily country names, that new gTLDs are not allowed to
allocate to anyone." 6 This is an exercise of real power, and it is being
exercised in service to the interests represented in the GAC, even though
there is no relevant law in most countries, nor at the international level,
that would require the owner of the TLD to withhold those potentially
valuable names from the market."'
ICANN also uses its power over the root to "tax" (require
Alex Tajirian, Examining Value in New IC/1NN TLDs on Search and Navigation, Companies,
PST),
11:21
AM
(Aug.
14,
2009,
CIRCLEID
Registries,
Domain
2000,
the
In
http://www.circleid.com/posts/examininng-value-in new icanntids.
government of Tuvalu leased out their ccTLD ".tv" for $50 million over a twelve-year period.
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tv.html (click on the drop
box entitled "Introduction") (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
113. See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN, "InternetStability,"and the New Top Level Domains,
in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: PROMISES,
PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS 3, 18 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Shane M. Greenstein eds., 2002).
114. See ICM Registry, LLC v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., Int'l Ctr. for
Dispute Resolution, at 70 (Feb. 19, 2010).
115. The classic example is an imaginary claim by the holder of the (then valid) trademark
on "computer brand socks," COMPUTER, Registration No. 1,282,545, to be given the rights
to computer.dd, even though "computer" is generic for something other than footwear.
116. See ICANN, DRAFT APPLICANT GUIDEBOOK, VERSION 4 annex Separable
Country Names List (2010); TIMOTHY DENTON & MAWAKI CHANGO, ICANN AND
IANA RESERVED NAMES (2007); see also, e.g., ICANN, AERO AGREEMENT APPENDIX 6
(2009),
RESERVED
NAMES
SCHEDULE
OF
http://www.icann.org/en/tlds/agreements/aero/aero-appendix-6-1ljunO9-en.htm.
117. Froomkin, supra note 84, at 840.
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contractual payments from) the registrars and registries,"' costs that in
most cases are passed on to the end-user. That ICANN determines the
market structure for domain names is not a critique, but rather a design
feature-something built into its DNA from the seminal White Paper
that called ICANN into being. And while ICANN has not created
nearly as much competition among registry terms of service as one might
hope for, its early moves in particular broke NSI/VeriSign's monopoly as
the only commercial domain registrar that mattered. There is now a
flourishing competitive market in new domain name registrations, albeit
one marked by a certain lack of attractive new stock and by various
technology-based attempts to corner the market in abandoned names.119
One economic risk is that ICANN (or any other party controlling
the DNS) might abuse its power by seeking extortionate payments
(rents) from the registrars or registries. As ICANN's status as a
nongovernmental body becomes increasingly solidified, it should become
increasingly uncontroversial that the appropriate constraint on these
negotiations come from private law and ordinary regulation, particularly
anti-trust law.'20 In this context, ICANN's promise to remain in the
U.S., and thus remain subject to U.S. anti-trust law is significant. So too
is its promise to have offices around the globe, potentially making it

subject to local private law remedies where it has offices, and also to the
competition law jurisdiction of the EU.12 '
118. In the 2009 fiscal year, ICANN raised $60 million, $54.8 million of which came
from domain name registry and registrar fees. ICANN, 2009 COMPLETE REPORT:
ADDRESSING THE GLOBAL INTERNET 58 (2009). This represents a $10 million revenue
increase over 2008, nearly all of which came from the domain name registry and registrar fees.
Id.
119. See, e.g. Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Technical Responses to Unilateral
Internet Authority: The Deployment of VeriSign "Site Finder"and ISP Response, BERKMAN
CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/tlds/sitefinder (last
updated Oct. 7, 2003); Declan McCullagh, ICANNApproves Wait List for Desired Domains,
CNET NEWS (Mar. 9, 2004), http://news.cnet.com/ICANN-approves-wait-list-for-desireddomains/2100-1038_3-5171809.html; ICANN SEC. & STABILITY ADVISORY COMM., SAC
022: SSAC ADVISORY ON DOMAIN NAME FRONT RUNNING (2007) (describing "front
running," the practice of monitoring and preemptive registration of domain names searched
for but not reserved by a potential registrant).
120. See Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 505-07
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN &dAntitrust, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 72-73) (rejecting application of Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine to
VeriSign's transactions with ICANN).
121. Prior to the Affirmation, European Union Media and Telecommunications
Commissioner Viviane Reding called for an "independent, international tribunal" to review
ICANN's decisions. See Eric Pfanner, New Chief Defends US. Base for Agency that Manages
Web,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
13,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/technology/internet/13iht-icannl3.html.
Having
ICANN present in the EU and subject to its jurisdiction would seem at least as likely to
achieve the EU's regulatory objectives regarding competition law, although perhaps not as
much in other realms where the court option is less likely to be effective.
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Another economic risk is that control of the DNS could be abused
to erect anti-competitive barriers to entry to the market for new domain
names, or structure the market oligopolistically. At present in the registry
market, there are not significant barriers to entry, but there are some
obstacles to price and service competition. ICANN's levies on market
participants put a floor on prices. And ICANN's requirement that
registrars impose some standard contract terms on registrants limits
service competition in the service of third parties, that is, trademark
holders.122 This in turn creates the possibility that, as a result of
limitations in the domain names available, late entrants to the Internet
and especially smaller businesses and startups might find it more difficult
to market online due to the shortage of semantically attractive domain
names.123
B.

Regulatory Power Over Registrants and Other End-Users

More importantly, ICANN's power over the end-user extends well
beyond the economic realm in which it can set a fee of a dollar or more
per domain name. By requiring the registries-as a condition of being
listed in the root-to require the registrars to include standard form
terms in their contracts with registrants, ICANN gains a degree of
control over registrants, at least to the extent that a registrar could
impose terms in a contract with the end-user. To date, ICANN has used
this power only for matters ostensibly relating to trademark issues raised
by domain name registrations, most notably its imposition of the
Uniform Domain Name Process ("UDRP")124 and retention of antiprivacy rules relating to the "whois" function.125
The interesting question, therefore, is how much this ability to
impose contractual legal duties on domain name registrants could be
used for other things, too. In theory, ICANN (or any other entity
controlling the root) could attempt to leverage that control in either of
two ways. First, and more plausibly, control over the root could be used
to impose additional contract terms on registrants in service of social
goals. Various suggestions have been floated over the past decade,
122. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, ICANNs "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"Causesand (Partial)Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2002).
123. See Karl Manheim & Lawrence Solum, An Economic Analysis ofDomain Name Policy,
25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT LJ. 359 (2003); see also Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Pathologies of
Accountability: ICAN and the Challenge of "Multiple Accountabilities Disorder," 65 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 94, 101 (2005).
124. See Froomkin, supra note 122, at 651-52 (relating to imposition of UDRP).
125. On conflicts between ICANN's Whois policy and privacy laws, see Letter from
EPIC & NGO to ICANN Board on Need for Whois Reform (Oct. 30, 2007), availableat
http://ipjustice.org/wp/2007/10/30/epic-ngo-letter-to-icann-board-on-need-for-whoisreform.
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including proposals that ICANN require registrants to enforce copyright
laws, remove some classes of hate speech, agree to takedown provisions,
or otherwise assist law enforcement or others in the enforcement of legal
or social policies. These suggestions have all differed from the UDRP in
one critical fashion: whatever its merits or evils, the UDRP is designed to
combat an ill-cybersquatting-that is a direct result of the structure of
the DNS. In contrast, all of the other proposals that have bubbled up
from time to time involve harms that are not direct results of the DNS;
they may be torts or crimes that result from use of the Internet, but they
2 6 and so far ICANN, to its credit, has
are not specific to the DNS"
shown no appetite for taking them on.
Somewhat less plausibly, control over the root also might be used to
require that registrants themselves impose terms on parties with whom
they contract either directly or indirectly via "web wrap"' 7 contracts with
people who visit their websites or read their e-mails. Thus, everyone
registering a domain name would have to agree, for example, that it
would never be used to infringe a copyright or send a threatening e-mail
from a user address at that domain. In theory, this obligation on the
registrant to bind his customers or readers would work in a manner akin
to the way that ICANN requires registrars to impose contracts on their
registrants. But in fact, the scope for such terms in domain name
agreements must be extremely limited. For starters, it is far from obvious
that such terms would be effective, especially in consumer contracts, in
many parts of the globe. More fundamentally, there is only so much that
most registrants would put up with before walking away from domain
names and towards some alternative.128
C.

PoliticalPower Over Speech and Other Uses ofthe Internet

Control of the root arguably might translate into political power. In
particular some have warned that control of the root could be used to
limit freedom of expression,129 while others have sought to harness the
126. The theoretical exception to this principle might be second (or higher-level?) domain
names that were themselves obscene, harassing, or threatening. Presumably because this is at
most a very minor problem compared to the number of names registered, there has been no
serious effort to address this through the ICANN process.
127. Also known as "browsewrap" agreements, a "web wrap" contract is one in which the
consumer is said to be bound by viewing the agreement. On the validity of these agreements,
compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), with Step-Saver Data Sys.,
Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), and Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.,
CV 99-7654 HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000).
128. Many social networks flourishing online already use addressing schemes independent
of the DNS. Twitter, for example, handles all message traffic between users within its single
domain. See also infra text at note 151 (noting importance of online search).
129. The danger is already manifest in cases of product or brand criticism, which can lead
to a domain name being reassigned under ICANN's uniform dispute resolution policy. See
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power conferred by the root for what they see as the good,' causing yet
others to warn of ICANN-enforced domination of the Internet.'
Control over the DNS can clearly be used to restrict the semantic
content of TLDs-and as noted above, it is being used that way today.
Under the current ICANN regime there is never going to be a .god or
.satan domain name both because too many people would find it
offensive or at least controversial, and because the process of picking the
body to run them would be highly contentious. I and many others long
ago proposed that ICANN should not attempt to control the semantic
content of TLDs, but rather should only pass on the technical and
organizational bona fides of applicants. Once cleared, they could pick any
name they wanted that was not already taken. This proposal would have
made highly controversial names possible, yet shielded ICANN from the
blame. Even so, it did not attract much support, perhaps because it
would have reduced ICANN's power over applicants, or because it
created the possibility of conflicts between TLDs if someone picked a
name too similar (in the eye of some beholder) to an already-existing
name.132
But even if deities and demons will not be TLDs, they can be, and
are, second-level domains.' 33 The lost expressive value of a TLD seems
SUSAN SCHIAVETTA & KONSTANTINOS KOMAITIS, ICANN's ROLE IN CONTROLLING
INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET (2003); Froomkin, supra note 122, at 664; Jonathan L.
Schwartz, Making the Consumer Watchdog's Bark As Strong As Its Gripe: Complaint Sites and the
ChangingDynamic ofthe Fair Use Defense, 16 ALB. L. J. SCI. &TECH. 59, 78 (2006).
130. E.g. Cheryl B. Preston, Internet Porn, ICANI, and Families:A Call To Action, 12 J.
INTERNET L. 3 (2008).
131. For example, there is this somewhat overwrought warning:
Down the road, one can imagine demands from Brussels that ICANN cooperate
with EU efforts to tax commercial sales negotiated over the Internet. Or perhaps it
will demand a new understanding aimed at forcing top level domain managers to
uphold EU privacy standards against U.S. government security measures.
Jeremy Rabkin, Careful What You Wish For: Why ICANN "Independence" is a Bad Idea,
CIRCLEID
(June
22,
2009,
5:50
AM
PST),
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20090622_careful~whatyouwish-icann-independencebad i
dea.
132. The desire to prevent semantic confusion must be seen as a policy goal of ICANN
and/or of governments influencing it although the right to protect a TLD from confusion by
excluding alternatives is not rooted in law: most authorities agree that a TLD cannot be a
trademark See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
EXAMINATION GUIDE No. 2-99, MARKS COMPOSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, OF
at
available
(1999),
NAMES
DOMAIN
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/resources/exam/guide299.jsp ("When a trademark, service
mark, collective mark or certification mark is composed, in whole or in part, of a domain
name, neither the beginning of the URL (http://www.) nor the TLD have any source
indicating significance.").
133. E.g., god.com and satan.com, both of which are registered to a party protecting its
identity, with only the following showing under whois: do Nameview Inc. Whois IDentity
Shield, PO Box 152, Britton's Hill, St. Michael, Barbados. (This information can be obtained
by running the "whois" command on any UNIX computer connected to the Internet; i.e. by
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quite small when so many second-level alternatives are available. As for
the suggestion that the DNS could be leveraged to work a major change
in privacy law, it is hard to see how the controller of the root would pull
this off-other than an end-user's contract with a registrar possibly being
used as a jurisdictional hook by which a national government would seek
extraterritorial application of a local law.
So much then for what a rational master of the root could do. But
there is no certainty that the master will always be rational. The
Affirmation states that "ICANNis a private organization and nothing in
this Affirmation should be construed as control by any one entity."134 Yet
independence from capture is not achieved by fiat. Suppose that through
a nefarious and careful plot some interest group-political, religious, or
economic-were able to capture ICANN and then attempted to make
the most of their control of the root without regard for long-term
political or economic consequences.135 At present, the danger of most
forms of political or religious capture seems somewhat remote if only
because the U.S. Government retains some leverage over ICANN as
described above in part I.B.2. (Of course, some people might suggest
that the U.S. Government itself might be subject to capture, or has been
captured, by an interest group. But in that scenario, we have much bigger
problems than misuse of the DNS.) Admittedly, the risk of capture by an
economic interest group seems less far-fetched, especially given
arguments that ICANN was or is captured by an alliance of trademark
interests and early movers in the TLD space who conspired togetherperhaps with the tacit blessing of the U.S. Government-to block new
entrants into the TLD market.136 But as noted previously, the remedy for
this sort of abuse remains, for better or worse, a reference to anti-trust
law.137
What then might a fanatical political or religious group be able to
typing "whois satan.com.").
8.
134. AFFIRMATION, supra note 1,
135. ICANN itself seems concerned about this prospect. See ICANN, IMPROVING
INSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENCE

IN

ICANN

(2008),

http://www.icann.org/en/jpa/iic/improving-confidence.htm (noting dangers of capture and
making recommendations to lessen danger of capture).
136. Todd Davies, A Behavioral Perspective on Technology Evolution and Domain Name
Regulation, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEv. L.J. 1, 24 (2008) (arguing that
ICANN is at risk of "oligarchic" control); Comments of the Center for Democracy and
Technology submitted to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
U.S. Dept of Commerce, Regarding the Continued Transition of the Technical Coordination
and Management of the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System: Midterm Review
2008),
25,
8
(Jan.
Agreement
Joint
Project
the
of
http://www.cdt.org/dns/icann/20080128_CDT-JPA-comments.pdf (warning of capture by of
ICANN by governments); Jonathan Zittrain, ICAhW: Between the Public and the Private
Comments Before Congress, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1071, 1091 (1999).
137. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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do? As noted earlier, there are opportunities for financial gain. And there
are ways to twist the future growth of the domain system to support, or
avoid hurting, beliefs about offensive semantic content of TLDs.
Onerous contracts with new TLDs might limit their registrations only to
approved names, or perhaps attempt to require that they police their
users, but it would be no simple matter to enforce similar rules on either
the existing gTLDs or ccTLDs. The gTLDs have contractual rights in
their delegations, and so long as courts remain open to enforce them,
ICANN is subject to their jurisdiction, and the physical root is in
VeriSign's control, the ordinary procedures of the courts should be fully
adequate to guard against any chicanery. The ccTLDs often have a
government behind them, and short of pulling the plug or re-delegating
the domain to someone else-the nuclear option-in the current
contractual regime there may be little that ICANN could do to seriously
damage a ccTLD."'
At the end of the day, the greatest risk to the domain system from
control of the root comes only if governments act in concert with the
root's controller. At that point, instead of civil law and diplomatic
pressure working to counter-balance an attempt to leverage control of the
root to achieve a social or political aim, both the technical and legal arms
would be working together. That might be bad. And that is why the
increasing power of the GAC might give one a slight pause. On the one
hand, the existence of the GAC provides a source of external supervision
over ICANN's activities; on the other hand, GAC also provides a route
by which governments-in the somewhat rare event that they can
broadly agree on a common goal-might be able to harness the root to
some extraneous end. If, for example, governments around the globe
were to decide that Internet anonymity was a bad thing that needed to be
stamped out, and if they passed domestic laws prohibiting it, the field
might then be open to use the root to make life difficult for Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs") and website operators who provided
138. As ICANN's previous fight with ccTLDs demonstrated, there are things ICANN
can do to annoy them, notably to refise routine redelegation requests when, say, a ccTLD
operator changes its machinery around. But the ccTLDs managed to muddle through a
lengthy period in which ICANN mistreated them in this way, and they could surely do it
again if they had to. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 120, at 54. It has been suggested that
the U.S. leaned on ICANN to redelegate domains in countries of strategic importance to it:
[T]wice United States-backed governments (namely Iraq and Afghanistan) have
petitioned for redelegation of a country's ccTLD. Both requests were approved.
While there is no evidence that the United States explicitly instructed ICANN to
redelegate the .iq or the .af top-level domains, it is reasonable to conclude that
ICANN felt pressure to comply because the Department of Commerce still has
authority over it.
Scott P. Sonbuchner, Master Of Your Domain: Should the US. Government Maintain Control
Over the Internet'sRoot?, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 183, 202 (2008).
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anonymizing services.

The real prize, and the real danger here, is not the DNS: it is the IP
numbering system. It is not complex to exist online without a domain
name. It is impossible to exist online in today's Internet without the use
of an IP number. The power over IP numbers, such as it is, comes with
the IANA function. It is IANA that hands out blocks of IP numbers to
the Regional Internet Registries ("RIRs"), who in turn hand them out to
ISPs and others who demonstrate a need for them. And recall that
IANA, at least at present, remains in ICANN's hands through a separate
contract from the U.S. Government. So long as the U.S. keeps at least a
reversionary interest in IP numbers by having contracts with ICANN
that require routine renewal and that contain a termination clause, this
danger remains fairly small. In any case, the RIRs are independent of
ICANN, so there is not much ICANN can do to them except not give
them new numbers. There are only five RIRs and they could act together
in self-defense if ICANN were ever to try to starve them or, worse,
attempted to destroy the Internet by giving the same number blocks to
multiple recipients in an attempt to create IP number conflicts. The
Affirmation is silent on IANA's fate, but there are powerful reasons why
both the U.S. Government and ICANN might wish to preserve the
status quo. On the U.S. Government's side, the IANA arrangement
remains a less controversial fail-safe against the eventuality that if
ICANN were ever to be captured by fanatics or otherwise go off the rails,
the theoretical ability to reassign the IANA function creates a lever that
the DOC could use to cripple a runaway ICANN. On ICANN's side, its
status as a government contractor supplying numbers in accordance with
U.S. federal policy provides a valuable shield against what might
otherwise be plausible anti-trust risks. Then again, third parties outside
the U.S. are watching carefully and clearly hope that the U.S. will
internationalize this relationship. 139
D.

The Myth ofthe DNS's Geo-StrategicPower

Perhaps the strangest canard about the DNS is that control over it
confers some sort of geo-strategic power.140 From time to time writers
139. See, e.g., Neelie Kroes, Vice-President, European Comm'n Responsible for the
Digital Agenda, The Need for Accountability in Internet Governance, ICANN's 38th
at
available
2010),
21,
(June
Meeting
International
("I am hopeful
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/323
that the expiry of the IANA contract next year will be turned into an opportunity for more
international cooperation serving the global public interest.").
140. Various forms of this view can be found in Kim G. von Arx & Gregory R. Hagen,
Sovereign Domains:A DeclarationofIndependence ofccTLDsfrom Foreign Control, 9 RICH. J.L.
&TECH. 1, 26-28 (2002) (ccTLDs as potential military resource and DNSs role in "Strategic
Information Warfare"); Larry Barker, Information Assurance: Protecting the Army's Domain-
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have suggested that by controlling the DNS the United States enjoys
some potential advantage that might be deployed in case of real war or
cyber-war. The first assertion is clearly wrong; the second seems
implausible also.
The scenario seems to go something like this. The United States
gets into a shooting war with Ruritania. The Ruritanians rely on the
Internet for critical military and civilian communications. If the U.S.
could knock out Ruritanian Internet communications, it would secure a
material military advantage. So far, so good. But how is control of the
DNS supposed to achieve this? Apparently by the U.S. using its power
over the DNS to delete Ruritania's ccTLD, bringing the nation to its
virtual knees.
Like every nation, the Ruritanians have a ccTLD, which we will
imagine is .rt.141 There is no question that whoever controls the root can
delete .rt from the root:
In theory, the United States could demand that a specific country's
ccTLD be erased. [In this view,] [b]ecause the Department of
Commerce still has ultimate authority over ICANN, it [would be]
able to bypass ICANN procedure and make demands [either that
ICANN instruct VeriSign to delete .rt, or make the demand of
VeriSign directly, or seize control of the computer with the root zone
file.] Erasing a top-level domain would effectively [cause] all websites
using that suffix [to become inaccessible to most users] and
prevent ... e-mailing [from reaching] any such addresses. An entire
country's Internet presence would disappear for the majority of
Internet users. [Fear of this scenario may explain] why some of the
main critics of ICANN are countries with poor relationships with the
United States.142
The introduction of DNS Security Extensions ("DNSSEC")143 into
the root zone alteration process only changes the details of this scenario
in that seizing the computer controlling the root zone is no longer
enough: now the U.S. Government needs access to VeriSign's key
Name System, ARMY
COMMUNICATOR, SUMMER 2001, at 39, available at
http://www.signal.army.miVocos/ac/Edition,%20Summer/Summer%2001/dnsia.htm (risks to
military operations); Ariel Rabkin, Who Controls the Internet?, WKLY STANDARD, MAY 15,
2009, at 14 (political and economic influence via DNS); Sonbuchner, supra note 138, at 207
(controller of the DNS could create and enforce 'terms of... use" for the Internet).
141. The list of genuine ccTLDs appears at IANA, Root Zone Database,
http://www.iana.org/domains/root/db (last visited Nov. 27, 2010). At present (November,
2010), there is no .rt.
142. Sonbucher, supra note 138, at 203.
143. A lawyer's introduction to DNSSEC in the root can be found at Notice, Enhancing
the Security and Stability of the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System, 73 Fed.
Reg. 59,608 (Oct. 9, 2008). A software engineer's introduction can be found at Documentation,
ROOT DNSSEC, http://www.root-dnssec.org/documentation (last visited Nov. 27, 2010).
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signing key as well.'" Otherwise, as before, in order to achieve the
change it wants, the U.S. Government must persuade ICANN and
VeriSign, or just VeriSign, to make the change the U.S. Government
demands. 45
If, for whatever reason, the root zone file were changed to eliminate
.rt, then in the ordinary course of things, as the new root zone file
propagates across the net, addresses ending in .rt will stop functioning
because computers no longer know where to find the .rt registry's file
that would tell them where to send packets destined for .rt domains.
Ruritania is in chaos! U.S. forces are met with flowers ... wait, wrong
movie ....
The scenario gains some potential plausibility due to the location of
the root zone file in the U.S. Even if ICANN has rules prohibiting
political deletions or surreptitious change of control of a domain, it is
possible that if faced with a claim of national emergency VeriSign or
whoever was running the server hosting the root zone file would allow
the U.S. to do whatever it asked. That at least appears to be what several
phone companies did when asked to allow illegal wiretaps in the name of
national security.146
Even so, it could never work that way, and it certainly could never
work that way twice.
For starters, unless the government of Ruritania is technically
clueless, 147 it will have taken two simple steps that will protect it against
144. See supra note 78.
145. Other than the fact that VeriSign operates this computer as a U.S. Government
contractor, I am not aware of any legal authority that would require VeriSign to accede to such
a request. The IANA contract might arguably provide legal cover for this act, although there is
certainly nothing in there that would require it. The LANA Contract states that the IANA
function
includes receiving delegation and redelegation requests, investigating the
circumstances pertinent to those requests, and making its recommendations and
reporting actions undertaken in connection with processing such requests. This
function, however, does not include authorizing modifications, additions, or
deletions to the root zone file or associated information that constitute delegation or
redelegation of top level domains. (This purchase order does not alter root system
responsibilities as set forth in Amendment 11 of the Cooperative Agreement NCR9218742 between the DoC and VeriSign, Inc.).
IANA Contract, supra note 15, § C.2.1.1.2. Amendment 11, supra note 76, does not explicitly
consider whether NSI/VeriSign could ever act independently of ICANN, although the section
on "Recognition of NewCo" could be read to suggest not. In any event, the U.S. Government
could always request, even demand, VeriSign's cooperation citing national security, even if
there were no contractual grounds for doing so. And VeriSign, if it agreed cooperation was in
the national interest, or otherwise served a corporate interest, might agree to do what it was
asked.
146. See In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 700 F.Supp.2d 1182 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (most recent proceeding in a lawsuit alleging systematic surreptitious and illegal
domestic wiretaps by NSA).
147. Just as all criminals are not clever, so too all governments are not technically adept.
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the disappearance of the .rt domain. First, it will have registered many
names in .com or some other TLD and pointed those names to its
critical sites as backups. Second, it will have recorded the IP numbers of
the most critical sites, burned them to CDs, and distributed those disks
to its military and critical infrastructure. If the .rt domain suddenly starts
disappearing, then forewarned internet users in Ruritania will start using
the alternate domain names or will fire up the emergency CD and write
over their cached copy of the zone file.
More insidiously, the U.S. could quietly enter a re-delegation into
the root, grabbing control of .rt. Then the U.S. would mirror the old .rt
information on its new machine and use its control to enable traffic
analysis and perhaps even eavesdropping. As the U.S. built up a database
of .rt second-level domains from the queries it received, or by other
national technical means, it could quietly insert some changes in the .rt
second level records that would send all traffic to a U.S. machine before
being sent on to its original destination. This attack is subtler, but
Ruritanian technologists should be able to detect it almost instantly by
monitoring the root which, after all, is public and must be visible in order
to achieve its function. If the delegation of .rt changed, they could sound
the alarm and apply the same counter-measures as in the more direct
deletion scenario.
Next, consider the reaction of key Internet players such as major
ISPs. Ordinarily they set their computers to mechanically copy
alterations in the master zone file and to use the most recent file to serve
their users. But if they become aware that the file has been intentionally
tampered with for political reasons, at least some of them will go to their
backup copies and manually restore .rt to their cached copies of the root.
Certainly any ISPs in .rt will be forced to restore it, and internal .rt
communications will recover quickly; how much the outside world will
be able to send in data will depend on how the world internet technical
community responds initially.
But that's not all. Even if the disruption were effective for a day or
two due to the Ruritanian failure to anticipate and plan for the problem,
the international community would ensure that it never happened again
by switching to an alternate system that no longer relied on a file that the
U.S. could manipulate single-handedly. 4 8 The bottom line is that
whatever geo-strategic power exists over the root, it can only be exercised

Even so, what are the odds of there being a large number of foreign governments technically
adept enough to have their militaries rely on Internet communications and addresses provided
via the national ccTLD, yet not take basic steps to protect those communications?
148. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 49 (arguing that such a ploy would work only once
because the international community would immediately stop mirroring ICANN's root server
regardless of whether it split the root).
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once, if at all.
CONCLUSION
As a legal document, the Affirmation itself is a paper tiger. It may
not be a contract; even if it is a contract, there is no practicable way for
either of the parties to enforce it (and almost no promises by the U.S.
Government). Although both parties have a right to cancel the
Affirmation upon notice, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which
either party would have anything to gain by such an act-and is also not
that easy to imagine circumstances in which the cancellation would
actually make a legal difference to either party. Indeed, the most
important legal aspect of the Affirmation is that it is not the JPA which
it replaced, for the JPA had some teeth.
In contrast, the Affirmation likely will be much more meaningful as
a political document. By announcing in the Affirmation that it would
allow the JPA to lapse, the U.S. signaled that it was giving up the most
visible of its claims to direct control of ICANN. In so doing, it gave up
powers that it could reasonably have calculated it would be unlikely to
use: there must be some non-zero risk that ICANN could be captured by
an ideological faction but, unlike the risk of economic capture,
ideological capture does not seem a major worry at present. By further
enhancing the power of the GAC, the U.S. DOC sought, with it appears
some success, to meet the most vociferous critics of the unique U.S. role
in the governance of the DNS (or, if you prefer, background supervision
of the governor of the DNS) more than half way, yet without completely
giving up its fail-safe powers, those deriving from the IANA contract
and from ICANN's domicile in California.
If the U.S. won some breathing room from its critics, and the
international community achieved a large step towards its agenda of
internationalizing the control of the governance of the DNS, the biggest
winner from the Affirmation undoubtedly remains ICANN itself.
ICANN is now free of U.S. Government control (except perhaps at the
extreme margin) and yet still substantially free of real control by other
governments. World governments must channel their influence via the
GAC. The GAC has real influence over ICANN, but it does not have
control. This fact, and the fact that the residual U.S. influence is not
totally eradicated, has caused some non-U.S. leaders to call for yet more
divestment by the U.S., but so far these calls have been rare.14 9
Newly unchained, or at least on a very long leash, ICANN enjoys
unprecedented freedom to shape its own fate and to decide what sort of
body it wants to be. In losing the specter of undue U.S. influence,
149. See e.g., Kroes, supra note 139.
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ICANN has also lost its major excuse for failing to live up to its
professed ideals of transparency and accountability to the wider Internet
community. What will happen next depends in large part on the extent
to which ICANN's struggle for autonomy has shaped its DNA, and to
what extent ICANN is ready to transcend its past. Developments to
watch include the unfolding of the ICANN-GAC relationship, whether
ICANN's budget continues its rapid growth or stabilizes, and whether
ICANN's new freedom allows it to move forward on new gTLDs.
The DOC's next big decision will come no later than September 30,
2011, when the DOC must decide the fate of the IANA contract.so
Until then at least, ICANN is unlikely to make any new moves to
leverage its power over the legacy root in order to control the behavior,
much less the speech, of end-users in any realm other than the trademark
arena already occupied by the UDRP. The fear that it might attempt to
expand its reach, either on its own or if captured by some outside group,
remains the major argument for the U.S. to retain its hold on the IANA
function. On the other hand, if the U.S. accepts that, as argued above,
the DNS lacks geo-strategic value, the U.S. may be more willing to let
go.
In time, geo-strategy may not be the only arena in which the DNS's
centrality diminishes. If it is true that "[e]ighty percent of all online
sessions begin with search,"'s' then the DNS's importance to the World
Wide Web is well into its decline. Of course, the Web is not the
Internet; many other services from e-mail to video transport rely on the
DNS also. But the example of search, combined with the growth of
"walled garden" discursive communities such as MySpace and Facebook,
plus virtual worlds such as Second Life and World of Warcraft, all
suggest that the long-predicted moment when the human-readable
names for Internet addresses that the DNS enables begins to lose its
importance really is just around the corner.
Meanwhile, however, until something contactless like phone-tophone Bluetooth takes off, we will still need a human-friendly address to
give to new potential correspondents in one-to-one relationships.
Internet broadcasters, or their fine-tuned heavily personalized successors,
will need some way to advertise their presence and make it easy for users
to find them. At present, a nice memorable Web address works well on a
business card, the side of a bus, or in a short radio or TV commercial.
Thus, ICANN remains important because even if control of the DNS
has limited political relevance, that control still has substantial economic
importance-so long as the DNS's hegemony of convenience continues.
150. See supra note 15.
151. Jonathan Richman, 4 Technologies That Are Killing the URL, IMEDIA CONNECTION
(July 27, 2009), http://www.imediaconnection.com/content/23912.asp.
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POSTSCRIPT
As this article went to press, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), the agency within the Department
of Commerce charged with interacting with ICANN, set off the U.S.
government's first public post-Affirmation dispute with ICANN in a
letter from Assistant Secretary of Commerce Lawrence E. Strickling
protesting ICANN's plans to restart the new generic top-level domain
("gTLD") application process. 152
The gTLD issue has been one of the most contentious and longrunning disputes at ICANN. There are many applicants who seek new
gTLDs for a variety of reasons, ranging from a desire to enter the registry
(and in some cases also registrar) market for second-level domains to a
desire for a branded bespoke gTLD for internal use or marketing
purposes. On the other hand, there are powerful forces both within and
outside ICANN that oppose new gTLDs. Some intellectual property
rights-holders fear that new gTLDs will increase trademark infringement
opportunities and monitoring costs, and although they don't come out
and say it, some incumbent gTLD operators-many of whom are now
ICANN insiders-wish to hold on to first- and second-mover
advantages."s3 Some governments also have expressed concerns as to the
semantic content of potential new gTLDs on public order grounds, while
other non-governmental actors have expressed technical or aesthetic
objections to the proliferation of gTLDs.
After years of delay, ICANN, in 2010, took significant steps
towards restarting the gTLD application process, most notably by
proposing a new gTLD Applicant Guidebook,154 and opening it up for
public comment until January 15, 2011. The results and a timetable were
to be voted on at ICANN's Board Meeting in Cartagena in December
2010, a few days after Assistant Secretary Strickling sent his letter.15 5
The Strickling letter contained a specific complaint about the new
gTLD process and a more general complaint about ICANN's failure to
re-engineer its decision-making processes "to meet the obligations

152. See Letter from Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Sec'y for Commc'ns and Info. for
the Dep't of Commerce, and Adm'r, of the Nat'l Telecomm. and Info. Admin., to Rod
2010),
available at
and
CEO
(Dec.
2,
Beckstrom,
ICANN
President
http://forum.icann.org/ists/5gtld-guide/msgOO013.html [hereinafter Strickling Letter].
153. See, e.g. Milton Mueller, Comment to Why ICANN Should Ignore the N1T's Letter,
IGP
BLOG
(Dec.
5,
2010,
2:35
PM
EST),
http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2010/12/3/4694980.html#1386865.
154. See ICANN, GTLD APPLICANT GUIDEBOOK: PROPOSED FINAL VERSION

(2010).
155. See Welcome to the New Generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs) ProposedFinalApplicant
Guidebook Public Comment Forum, ICANN, http://icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/comments5-en.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).
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identified in the Affirmation (e.g., transparency, accountability, factbased policy development).1 s6 The specific complaint was that NTIA
had previously emphasized the importance of doing a full economic
analysis of the possible impact of new gTLDs and that ICANN had
failed to complete these studies and make them available for public
comment. In his letter, Assistant Secretary Strickling asked ICANN to
further delay the opening of the new gTLD application process until all
the economic studies were complete. Notably absent from the Strickling
letter, however, was any suggestion about what, if anything, NTIA
planned to do about its complaint other than to discuss them within the
GAC.
There are at least three ways to read this silence: One could see the
absence of any real threat as a case of the mailed fist in the velvet glove: if
NTIA really has power over ICANN, it may have no need to rub
ICANN's nose in it. On the other hand, the absence of any credible
threat other than recourse to GAC may reflect the reality that in the
post-Affirmation world there is nothing much else that NTIA could do
short of invoking the nuclear options of either re-assigning the IANA
contract,158 or perhaps telling VeriSign to ignore ICANN's instructions
to enter any new TLD into the root.' 59As a legal matter, the second view
seems to me to be the correct one. As a political matter, there seems no
chance that NTIA would unilaterally invoke either of these nuclear
options just to prevent the creation of new gTLDs.
A third, and also plausible, view paints the entire exercise as simple
political theater. The Commerce Department has tended to be very
solicitous of the interests of intellectual property rights holders. It is
likely that they have complained about ICANN's moves towards reopening the gTLD application process. In this view, the NTIA's letter is
little more than a sop to powerful interests, a way of showing that the
Obama administration is doing what it can, but one sent without any real
expectation that it will derail the process. This cynical view gains some
support from the relative weakness of Assistant Secretary Strickling's
substantive case regarding the lack of economic analysis of new gTLDs.
As explained by Milton Mueller, there have in fact been a plethora of
economic studies of the impact of new gTLDs, and the likely effects are
well understood.160
On the other hand, Assistant Secretary Strickling's specific
156. Strickling Letter, supra note 152, at 2.
157. Id.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89; see alsosupra text following note 150.
159. See supra note 78.
160. See Milton Mueller, Why ICANN Should Ignore the NTd's Letter, IGP BLOG (Dec. 3,
2010,
4:52
PM
EST),
http://blog.intemetgovemance.org/blogLarchives/2010/12/3/4694980.html.
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complaint has some procedural validity, and ties in to his more general
complaint about the lack of transparency and regularity in ICANN's
decision-making. Even if there have been improvements in the year since
the Affirmation was signed, when measured by the relatively demanding
standards of the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act for example,
ICANN's decision-making still leaves a great deal to be desired. It is a
bedrock principle of U.S. administrative law that an agency limits its
decisions to the record before it and discloses all the facts on which it
plans to rely when setting out a proposed rule. ICANN works on a much
more relaxed system in which it is not necessarily easy to identify all the
relevant facts on which a decision may be based. For example, some of
the economic studies to which Prof. Mueller refers-all of which are
surely known to ICANN-were not formally part of the record ICANN
assembled for public comment. And whenever the ICANN Board meets,
as it was scheduled to do in Cartagena to discuss the gTLD issue, there
was always the possibility that it would emerge from its (private)
deliberations with an unexpected result-one that, were a U.S.
administrative agency to try, would be thrown out as a "bolt from the
blue" rather than a "logical outgrowth" of its proposed policy."6 ' In the
event, the Board voted in Cartagena to accept many of the gTLD-related
recommendations, but to delay the new gTLD process in order to
continue discussions with the GAC regarding its continuing claim that
governments should have a right to block new gTLDs they dislike on
grounds that they violate "morality and public order" or contain
geographic identifiers. 16 2
In the past, ICANN's explanations for its decisions have varied in
detail, rarely reaching the level that U.S. administrative agencies must
achieve in a final Notice of Rulemaking. Such flexibility is on the one
hand the hallmark of privatized governance, and on the other hand also
its bane.

161. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding final
rule cannot be a "bolt from the blue"); Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Test in
Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 214-15 (1996).
162. See ICANN, ADOPTED BOARD RESOLUTIONS § 2 (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-10declO-en.htm#2.

228

J ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L.

[Vol. 9

APPENDIX

AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS BY THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND THE
INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
NUMBERS
1. This document constitutes an Affirmation of Commitments
(Affirmation) by the United States Department of Commerce ("DOC")
and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN"), a not-for-profit corporation. In recognition of the
conclusion of the Joint Project Agreement and to institutionalize and
memorialize the technical coordination of the Internet's domain name
and addressing system (DNS),' globally by a private sector led
organization, the parties agree as follows:
2. The Internet is a transformative technology that will continue to
empower people around the globe, spur innovation, facilitate trade and
commerce, and enable the free and unfettered flow of information. One
of the elements of the Internet's success is a highly decentralized network
that enables and encourages decision-making at a local level.
Notwithstanding this decentralization, global technical coordination of
the Internet's underlying infrastructure - the DNS - is required to ensure
interoperability.
3. This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN,
including commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions made related to the
global technical coordination of the DNS are made in the public interest
and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability
and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and
consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and (d) facilitate international
participation in DNS technical coordination.
4. DOC affirms its commitment to a multi-stakeholder, private
sector led, bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical
coordination that acts for the benefit of global Internet users. A private
coordinating process, the outcomes of which reflect the public interest, is
best able to flexibly meet the changing needs of the Internet and of
Internet users. ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of
participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than
Internet users generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public
interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders,
1. For the purposes of this Affirmation the Internet's domain name and addressing
system (DNS) is defined as: domain names; Internet protocol addresses and autonomous
system numbers; protocol port and parameter numbers. ICANN coordinates these identifiers
at the overall level, consistent with its mission.
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ICANN commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and
negative effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial
impact on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the
systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.
5. DOC recognizes the importance of global Internet users being
able to use the Internet in their local languages and character sets, and
endorses the rapid introduction of internationalized country code top
level domain names (ccTLDs), provided related security, stability and
resiliency issues are first addressed. Nothing in this document is an
expression of support by DOC of any specific plan or proposal for the
implementation of new generic top level domain names (gTLDs) or is an
expression by DOC of a view that the potential consumer benefits of
new gTLDs outweigh the potential costs.
6. DOC also affirms the United States Government's commitment
to ongoing participation in ICANN's Governmental Advisory
Committee (GAC). DOC recognizes the important role of the GAC
with respect to ICANN decision-making and execution of tasks and of
the effective consideration by ICANN of GAC input on the public
policy aspects of the technical coordination of the Internet DNS.
7. ICANN commits to adhere to transparent and accountable
budgeting processes, fact-based policy development, cross-community
deliberations, and responsive consultation procedures that provide
detailed explanations of the basis for decisions, including how comments
have influenced the development of policy consideration, and to publish
each year an annual report that sets out ICANN's progress against
ICANN's bylaws, responsibilities, and strategic and operating plans. In
addition, ICANN commits to provide a thorough and reasoned
explanation of decisions taken, the rationale thereof and the sources of
data and information on which ICANN relied.
8. ICANN affirms its commitments to: (a) maintain the capacity
and ability to coordinate the Internet DNS at the overall level and to
work for the maintenance of a single, interoperable Internet; (b) remain a
not for profit corporation, headquartered in the United States of America
with offices around the world to meet the needs of a global community;
and (c) to operate as a multi-stakeholder, private sector led organization
with input from the public, for whose benefit ICANN shall in all events
act. ICANN is a private organization and nothing in this Affirmation
should be construed as control by any one entity.
9. Recognizing that ICANN will evolve and adapt to fulfill its
limited, but important technical mission of coordinating the DNS,
ICANN further commits to take the following specific actions together
with ongoing commitment reviews specified below:
9.1 Ensuring accountability, transparency and the interests of
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global Internet users: ICANN commits to maintain and improve robust
mechanisms for public input, accountability, and transparency so as to
ensure that the outcomes of its decision-making will reflect the public
interest and be accountable to all stakeholders by: (a) continually
assessing and improving ICANN Board of Directors (Board) governance
which shall include an ongoing evaluation of Board performance, the
Board selection process, the extent to which Board composition meets
ICANN's present and future needs, and the consideration of an appeal
mechanism for Board decisions; (b) assessing the role and effectiveness of
the GAC and its interaction with the Board and making
recommendations for improvement to ensure effective consideration by
ICANN of GAC input on the public policy aspects of the technical
coordination of the DNS; (c) continually assessing and improving the
processes by which ICANN receives public input (including adequate
explanation of decisions taken and the rationale thereof); (d) continually
assessing the extent to which ICANN's decisions are embraced,
supported and accepted by the public and the Internet community and
(e) assessing the policy development process to facilitate enhanced cross
community deliberations, and effective and timely policy development.
ICANN will organize a review of its execution of the above
commitments no less frequently than every three years, with the first
such review concluding no later than December 31, 2010. The review
will be performed by volunteer community members and the review team
will be constituted and published for public comment, and will include
the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the
Chair of the Board of ICANN, the Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information of the DOC, representatives of the
relevant ICANN Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations
and independent experts. Composition of the review team will be agreed
jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GAC members)
and the Chair of the Board of ICANN. Resulting recommendations of
the reviews will be provided to the Board and posted for public
comment. The Board will take action within six months of receipt of the
recommendations. Each of the foregoing reviews shall consider the
extent to which the assessments and actions undertaken by ICANN have
been successful in ensuring that ICANN is acting transparently, is
accountable for its decision-making, and acts in the public interest.
Integral to the foregoing reviews will be assessments of the extent to
which the Board and staff have implemented the recommendations
arising out of the other commitment reviews enumerated below.
9.2 Preserving security, stability and resiliency: ICANN has
developed a plan to enhance the operational stability, reliability,
resiliency, security, and global interoperability of the DNS, which will be
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regularly updated by ICANN to reflect emerging threats to the DNS.
ICANN will organize a review of its execution of the above
commitments no less frequently than every three years. The first such
review shall commence one year from the effective date of this
Affirmation. Particular attention will be paid to: (a) security, stability and
resiliency matters, both physical and network, relating to the secure and
stable coordination of the Internet DNS; (b) ensuring appropriate
contingency planning; and (c) maintaining clear processes. Each of the
reviews conducted under this section will assess the extent to which
ICANN has successfully implemented the security plan, the effectiveness
of the plan to deal with actual and potential challenges and threats, and
the extent to which the security plan is sufficiently robust to meet future
challenges and threats to the security, stability and resiliency of the
Internet DNS, consistent with ICANN's limited technical mission. The
review will be performed by volunteer community members and the
review team will be constituted and published for public comment, and
will include the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of
the GAC, the CEO of ICANN, representatives of the relevant Advisory
Committees and Supporting Organizations, and independent experts.
Composition of the review team will be agreed jointly by the Chair of
the GAC (in consultation with GAC members) and the CEO of
ICANN. Resulting recommendations of the reviews will be provided to
the Board and posted for public comment. The Board will take action
within six months of receipt of the recommendations.
9.3 Promoting competition, consumer trust, and consumer
choice: ICANN will ensure that as it contemplates expanding the
top-level domain space, the various issues that are involved (including
competition, consumer protection, security, stability and resiliency,
malicious abuse issues, sovereignty concerns, and rights protection) will
be adequately addressed prior to implementation. If and when new
gTLDs (whether in ASCII or other language character sets) have been in
operation for one year, ICANN will organize a review that will examine
the extent to which the introduction or expansion of gTLDs has
promoted competition, consumer trust and consumer choice, as well as
effectiveness of (a) the application and evaluation process, and (b)
safeguards put in place to mitigate issues involved in the introduction or
expansion. ICANN will organize a further review of its execution of the
above commitments two years after the first review, and then no less
frequently than every four years. The reviews will be performed by
volunteer community members and the review team will be constituted
and published for public comment, and will include the following (or
their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the CEO of
ICANN, representatives of the relevant Advisory Committees and
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Supporting Organizations, and independent experts. Composition of the
review team will be agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in
consultation with GAC members) and the CEO of ICANN. Resulting
recommendations of the reviews will be provided to the Board and
posted for public comment. The Board will take action within six
months of receipt of the recommendations.
9.3.1 ICANN additionally commits to enforcing its existing
policy relating to WHOIS, subject to applicable laws. Such existing
policy requires that ICANN implement measures to maintain timely,
unrestricted and public access to accurate and complete WHOIS
information, including registrant, technical, billing, and administrative
contact information. One year from the effective date of this document
and then no less frequently than every three years thereafter, ICANN
will organize a review of WHOIS policy and its implementation to assess
the extent to which WHOIS policy is effective and its implementation
meets the legitimate needs of law enforcement and promotes consumer
trust. The review will be performed by volunteer community members
and the review team will be constituted and published for public
comment, and will include the following (or their designated nominees):
the Chair of the GAC, the CEO of ICANN, representatives of the
relevant Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations, as well as
experts, and representatives of the global law enforcement community,
and global privacy experts. Composition of the review team will be
agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GAC
members) and the CEO of ICANN. Resulting recommendations of the
reviews will be provided to the Board and posted for public comment.
The Board will take action within six months of receipt of the
recommendations.
10. To facilitate transparency and openness in ICANN's
deliberations and operations, the terms and output of each of the reviews
will be published for public comment. Each review team will consider
such public comment and amend the review as it deems appropriate
before it issues its final report to the Board.
11. The DOC enters into this Affirmation of Commitments
pursuant to its authority under 15 U.S.C. 1512 and 47 U.S.C. 902.
ICANN commits to this Affirmation according to its Articles of
Incorporation and its Bylaws. This agreement will become effective
October 1, 2009. The agreement is intended to be long-standing, but
may be amended at any time by mutual consent of the parties. Any party
may terminate this Affirmation of Commitments by providing 120 days
written notice to the other party. This Affirmation contemplates no
transfer of funds between the parties. In the event this Affirmation of
Commitments is terminated, each party shall be solely responsible for the
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payment of any expenses it has incurred. All obligations of the DOC
under this Affirmation of Commitments are subject to the availability of
fuinds.
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